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Introduction
In his introduction to The Age of Revolution historian Eric Hobsbawm considers
“a few English words which were invented, or gained their modern meanings,
substantially in the period”1 between 1789 and 1848. The list includes ‘capitalism’,
‘socialism’, ‘aristocracy’, ‘liberal’, ‘conservative’, ‘nationality’, ‘crisis’, ‘journalism’,
and ‘ideology’. For Hobsbawm, “To imagine the modern world without these words
(i.e. without the things and concepts for which they provide names) is to measure the
profundity of the revolution which broke out between 1789 and 1848, and forms the
greatest transformation in human history since the remote times when men invented
agriculture and metallurgy, writing, the city and the state.”2 This analysis is relevant
when thinking of the Dreyfus case. To imagine the Affair without words such as
‘capitalism’, ‘aristocracy’, ‘nationality’, ‘crisis’, or ‘ideology’, is not hard, it is
impossible.
This thesis argues that the only way to fully understand the Dreyfus Affair is to
situate it inside a conflict between modernity and premodernity. Zeev Sternhell writes
that “the Affair provoked a conflict between two visions of the world, two conceptions
of society, two stairways of moral values.”3 4 In an intellectual sense the Affair brought
into the open the clash between two visions of man. Premodernity understands man as a
being determined by external circumstances – age, gender, family, social class, religion,
church, community, nation. Modernity, on the other hand, sees in each man an
individual; a being determined by his internal aspirations. Premodern man does not
know liberty; modern man does not know stability. Premodern man does not know
equality; modern man does not know community. If the two cannot be opposed it is
1
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because the shift from premodernity to modernity is not immediate and uncomplicated.
More importantly, an analysis of these conceptions must avoid being too categorical.
Elements of the modern are present in the premodern, and vice versa. By tracing the
divisions at the heart of the Dreyfus Affair one discovers that the modern period is in
fact torn between these two visions.
Before turning to the intellectual stakes, the Affair must be understood as the
personal drama of a French Jewish Captain under the Third Republic. In 1894 the
French Army discovered that secret military information had been received by the
German Embassy in Paris. After a short and biased investigation Alfred Dreyfus was
suspected and arrested. A court martial tried him based on one document and
unanimously convicted him after receiving a secret dossier made up of fabricated
evidence. The trial sparked important demonstrations of anti-Semitism. Dreyfus was
sent to Devil’s Island and after a prolonged period of silence the new head of
counterintelligence, Colonel Picquart, discovered that the real traitor was in fact another
officer, Esterhazy, and that most of the evidence had been forged. The matter slowly
turned into a national debate and after Esterhazy was acquitted by a court martial in
January 1898, Dreyfus’ few supporters mobilized for his cause. The turning point came
when the famous novelist Émile Zola wrote an open letter, J’accuse, to Félix Faure, the
President of the Republic. In the months that followed, the debate went from being a
legal discussion to a full-fledged ideological battle. After the forger of the documents,
Henry, committed suicide, and Esterhazy fled to England, a new trial was held at
Rennes in the summer of 1899. Dreyfus was again found guilty, but with mitigating
circumstances. The President then granted him a pardon and the Affair died out.

4

Dreyfus continued to fight for rehabilitation, and in 1906 he was finally reintegrated
into the Army and awarded the Legion of Honor. 5
I vaguely remember learning about the Dreyfus Affair as a young child. An
image that has stayed with me is an original copy of J’accuse. On a trip to Paris my
family decided to visit the Museum of Jewish History and Culture, and as I walked
through the galleries I came across a room dedicated to the Affair. J’accuse lay behind
glass and as I read over it I realized how confusing the matter seemed. I skipped most of
the first part quickly and moved on to the conclusion, with its famous repetitions of
J’accuse (I accuse). And yet, I knew none of the names and I could not verify any of the
claims. The letter appeared as a dramatic act but I was not quite sure why it still
resonated in the present. Having studied the Affair, the names of du Paty de Clam,
Mercier, Boisdeffre, are no longer meaningless. They are characters in an important
drama, and the legal matters touched upon by Zola are the realities of a man unjustly
accused and convicted. I learned more about the Affair throughout the years, but when I
gave thought to writing my thesis on the topic the obvious question came to mind: why
did the fate of one man – no matter how unjust – mobilize French society for decades?
Why did the French of 1898 and 1899 care about Dreyfus? Why did they attach such
importance to one case of individual iniquity?
Historians have of course touched on these questions in almost all imaginable
ways. I have many times read introductions to books and articles about the Affair that
begin by stating – or appreciating – the fact that so much research has been dedicated to
Dreyfus, as if they would have to justify their own attempt at understanding the
significance of the Affair. In the same way that the intellectuals, writers, journalists, and
politicians of the Third Republic used their efforts to defend or attack Dreyfus, we now
5
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continue to use our time for the analysis and understanding of this period. There are in
fact different levels to the Affair. There is the legal conflict between the fate of one
individual and the raison d’État: “It is a veritable national crime to weaken the military
institution, which is the protection of the country, in the name of the hypothetical
innocence of one individual.”6 More importantly, “For the trial to become an affair it
must have ideological implications. It must, in other words, develop into something
more than a strictly legal issue of innocence or guilt. Participants in an affair see
themselves as selflessly involved in a larger struggle, one that meshes into their general
political convictions, into their view of the world.”7 In this light the Dreyfus Affair was
also about the conflict between the individual and society, one that encompassed the
fight for universal justice; the immunity of the Army; the role of the Catholic Church in
society; the national question; and the place of Jews in France.8 In this last respect the
Affair revealed the power of political anti-Semitism and put into question the
completeness of emancipation and assimilation. Even though the Affair was not only
about anti-Semitism, anti-Semitism stimulated the debates of the Affair. Between the
universalism of the Enlightenment and the specificity of the Jewish question, between
the ideal of secularism and the religious foundations of the French nation, the
contradictions opposed republicans and reactionaries in their opinions on the
relationship between Church and State.9
All these questions seemed to point in one direction: a conflict between two
visions of the State. The stakes were “moral and political. On the moral level, the
Dreyfusards had defended the universal causes of Justice and Truth against the
6
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particular cause of the raison d’État,”10 and on the political level the antagonism was
between the preservation of republican institutions and the development of nationalism.
One vision saw France as the embodiment of universal values, another as the product of
a specific history and context. Stephen Wilson argues that “the encounter on the
national level between intellectuals and politicians of different persuasions,
championing on the one side the Army, the Nation and Reasons of State, and on the
other, Justice, the Rule of Law and Individual Rights, has had many chroniclers, but
they have not told us why this particular battle took place in the France of the 1890s.”11
Faced with this question and unconvinced by the argument of the role of the State, I
moved in a different direction. If Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards invoked particular
philosophical traditions the obvious next step was to go back to the origins of the
problem: the French Revolution. Zola saw the Affair as the culmination of 1789, and
many important anti-Dreyfusards as a symptom of the malady that had afflicted France
since the end of the Old Regime.
In this respect the question could be posed with particular attention to the
development of French intellectual thought during the nineteenth century, and in
accordance with preoccupations over how the Jewish question fit into the Affair.
Intellectual history is concerned with how ideas affect, and are affected, by the
historical setting in which they are created. This thesis takes as its starting point a crisis
under the French Third Republic, but it argues that in order to understand its historical
significance and contemporary relevance one must situate it within larger intellectual
trends. Only through a close reading of the preoccupations it created among intellectuals
can we grasp the significance of the Affair for the modern world.

10
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Chapter I
The Origins of the Dreyfus Affair
On July 19, 1870, France declared war on Prussia. Backed by the North German
Confederation, Prussia had also signed secret treaties of mutual defense with the South
German states of Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria. The war that followed was an
isolated conflict in which no other European powers were involved. A diplomatic clash
over the succession to the Spanish throne had resulted in the escalation of tensions
between the French Second Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. Otto von Bismarck,
the Chancellor of Prussia, had ensured that the confrontation would lead to war by
editing a telegram describing an encounter between King Wilhelm I and the French
ambassador in an incendiary light. Pressured by the press, public opinion, the political
establishment and his wife Empress Eugénie, Napoleon III ordered the general
mobilization of the French Army.
The Franco-Prussian War was a quick and disastrous defeat for the French. After
a series of German victories, Napoleon III and an army of over 100,000 were defeated
and captured at Sedan on September 2. The German forces were swift, better organized,
and had the tremendous backing of the modern and powerful Krupp artillery. On
September 4 the Third Republic was proclaimed in Paris and a Government of National
Defense was created to continue the fight against the Germans. The Prussian and
German armies made their way across northern France, quickly reaching Paris and
instating a siege on September 19 – it wasn’t lifted until January 28, 1871. Although at
first the new government decided to continue the war, by January it had become clear
that an armistice was necessary. The Treaty of Frankfurt, on May 10, 1871, put a
definitive end to the Franco-Prussian War, but its conditions were deeply resented by
the French. Territorially, Alsace and the Lorraine department of Moselle were annexed

8

to the newly formed German Empire and its residents given until October 1, 1872, to
decide whether they wanted to emigrate to France or remain under German control.
Financially, France was charged reparations of five billion francs due within three years,
requiring the German Army to occupy parts of France until it was fully paid.
For Prussia and the other German states the war resulted in the final unification
of the German Reich under Wilhelm I of Prussia, an event celebrated in the Hall of
Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles. For France it was a humiliating defeat which
brought the Second Empire to an end and took away two important provinces. The
power void created by the siege of Paris and the downfall of the Empire gave way to the
Paris Commune in March 1871. A National Guard created to defend Paris represented
an alternative to the power of the newly elected conservative coalition. As one
government signed an armistice with the Germans at Versailles, the other refused to
surrender its arms in Paris. On March 18 Louis-Adolphe Thiers, head of the new
executive power, ordered French troops to seize all arms within Paris. The National
Guard refused to do so and numerous army units joined in the rebellion. Thiers ordered
the government to evacuate Paris for Versailles just as the insurgents elected another
government on March 26: the Commune. For two months Thiers’ forces laid siege to
the Communards, climaxing in the ‘Bloody Week’ of May 21 to 28 in which it is
estimated that anywhere between 20,000 and 50,000 Parisians died. In those two
months the Communal Council adopted a number of social measures akin to
Jacobinism, including the re-adoption of the Revolutionary Calendar, the separation
between Church and State, the exclusion of religion from education, the confiscation of
Church property, the right to vote for women, the abolition of night work, and the
abolition of prison sentences for those unable to pay their debts.

9

The Commune came to a bloody end, and after 1871 the forces of reaction came
to the fore. Many expected a monarchy to be restored with a member of either the house
of Bourbon or Orleans as king, but the conservative Republic prevailed. The
constitutional laws of February 1875, which passed by only one vote in the Chamber of
Deputies, made it clear that France was a Republic with a President and two chambers
of parliament. The head of State was to be elected every seven years by the upper
chamber, the Senate. Until 1879 the President was General Patrice de Mac-Mahon,
Duke of Magenta, a convinced royalist who failed in his efforts to restore a
constitutional monarchy. The end of the decade saw the emergence of a new center-left
coalition in parliament that finally cemented the fate of the Third Republic.

In France, every regime since 1789 has understood itself in reaction to the
previous one. The Revolution sought to substitute the Ancien Régime with a new
Republic of virtue. The Directory was a response to the excesses of the Terror, the
Empire a manifestation of Napoleon’s desire for a centralized State, the Restoration an
attempt to move back the revolutionary tide – crushing it seemed impossible –, the July
Monarchy a bourgeois challenge to the aristocratic decay of the Bourbon system, the
Second Republic an effort to democratize France, the Second Empire a dictatorial return
to the First Empire’s cult of personality. The Third Republic was keen to avoid the
fiasco of the reign of Napoleon III by strengthening France’s military position in a
discreet yet determined manner. Domestically, the new order had to be cautious.
Learning from the short lived republican experiments of 1789, 1848 and 1871 the
supporters of the republican order had to prove effective at administering the country
and rebuilding the military as they pushed through with a number of controversial
reforms. The Commune had decreed the separation between Church and State and the
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exclusion of religion from public education. The latter would be a policy of Republican
governments after the Jules Ferry laws of 1881 to 1883, the former a more difficult
achievement to come only in 1905.
The period following the Presidency of Mac-Mahon – from 1879 on – is usually
referred to by historians as the Republic of the Opportunists.12 This was a fragile period
in the constitution of the Third Republic, governments rose and fell with great speed,
and many firmly believed the Republic would be easily overthrown. The most critical
political crisis came in 1886 in the form of Boulangism. In January, General Boulanger,
a xenophobic monarchist sympathizer, was appointed Minister of War. He “[reformed]
the army for the benefit of both the soldiers and the officers, and [was] regarded by the
public as the man destined to avenge France for the disasters of 1870.”13 In May 1887 a
new government excluded Boulanger from the War Ministry. Defying army rules he
mounted an election campaign in 1888 advocating the “revision of the constitution,
dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and revenge against Germany. His slogan [was]
‘Dissolve, Revise, Reconstitute.’”14 All types of Royalists rallied behind Boulanger,
who was elected to the Chamber of Deputies by a landslide on January 27, 1889. His
supporters urged him to overthrow the government by marching on l’Elysée, the
presidential palace. Because he hesitated, the Government had time to issue an order of
arrest against him. In August he had to flee to Brussels, where he committed suicide on
September 30, 1891. In the meantime the Republic had inaugurated an Exhibition
commemorating the centenary of the Revolution on May 6, 1889, exactly 100 years
after the reunion of the Estates General.15 The defeat of Boulangism shattered the hopes
of Royalists and conservatives, and yet “If the threat of Boulanger the adventurer was
12
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slight, the threat of Boulangism was more serious, and continued into the two crises of
the 1890s: the Panama scandal and the Dreyfus Affair.”16 As the moderate left gained
ground in subsequent elections, the 14th of July was instituted as a national holiday and
the tripartite motto Liberté, égalité, fraternité was adopted as the country’s maxim.
The first two decades of the Third Republic were not only a return to the beliefs
of 1789 in a symbolical sense. Even though the center-left coalition wanted to
demonstrate its ability to govern and maintain the social order intact, it nonetheless reintroduced the practice of careers open to merit. In this sense, the first part of Alfred
Dreyfus’ life is typical of a generation of rising soldiers and civil servants. A
juxtaposition of his trajectory alongside that of Ferdinand Walsin-Esterhazy provides
insight into the contradictions that dominated France after 1789.
Esterhazy was born in Paris on December 26, 1847. His father, General
Ferdinand Walsin-Esterhazy, was an illegitimate descendant of a well-known
aristocratic Austro-Hungarian family.17 When he was nineteen Esterhazy failed the
entrance examination to Saint-Cyr, one of the most prestigious military academies in
France. Determined to pursue a military career he was able to join the Roman Legion in
1868, just two years before the end of the Second Empire. After serving in Algeria in
the French Foreign Legion he was granted permission to join the French Army during
the Franco-Prussian War. During the 1870s Esterhazy took advantage of his aristocratic
connections to obtain a number of positions, key among them his appointment as a
German translator to the Section de Statistique, the counter-intelligence body created
after the Franco-Prussian War. In July 1882 he was finally accepted into the Legion of
Honor. He benefited from fast promotions: lieutenant in 1874, captain in 1880,
decorated in 1882, major in 1892, commander by 1894. With friends in high places,
16
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including Maurice Weil, and Captain Henry in the Section de Statistique,18 Esterhazy’s
career moved quickly. Pierre Birnbaum argues that Esterhazy greatly benefited from a
system of social alliances that undermined the authority of the Third Republic.19
The military career of Alfred Dreyfus could not have followed a more different
trajectory. Born in Mulhouse on October 9, 1859, Dreyfus was the son of a prosperous
textile industrialist from an old Jewish Alsatian family. After the War of 1870 the
family was forced to leave Mulhouse in order to keep its French nationality. Dreyfus
attended a number of boarding schools before preparing his entrance exam for the
prestigious École polytechnique, France’s elite engineering school founded in 1794. He
was admitted as number 182 out of 236,20 graduating 128th out of 235 in 1880. From
1880 to 1882 he attended the artillery school to receive training as an artillery officer.21
As France celebrated the centennial of the Revolution in 1889 Dreyfus was promoted to
the rank of captain. In 1890 he entered the École supérieure de guerre, a training school
created in 1876 that “sought to assure the primacy of a selection based essentially on
intellectual assessments.”22 Coming 9th out of 81 officers in November 1892 he became
a stagiaire (intern) with the General Staff in January 1893, a position he held until the
Affair erupted over a year later.
The role played by Jews in the French Army was analogous to their situation in
France since 1789. The Revolution had made them fully emancipated citizens in 1791,
capable of exercising all professions. Not even in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where
Jews enjoyed a privileged position, could a Jew rise in the State structure. Gustav
Mahler, for instance, was only able to accept the directorship of the Vienna Opera, an
18
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Imperial post, because he had previously converted to Catholicism. Dreyfus, like many
other Jews after 1791, profited from the French educative apparatus that helped
intelligent students move up the social ladder. There were about 300 Jewish officers in
the French Army at the time of the Dreyfus Affair. For Captain Dreyfus, as for most
other Jews in the Army, the modern French nation had offered them the possibility to
serve the State by turning them into citizens. However, as Jews like Dreyfus joined the
military, anti-Semitism increased. His access to the Army may have been due to good
examination results, but “this difference, like his character, [isolated] him in a certain
respect. He [had], in the army, neither ‘patron’ nor powerful backing. He [was] neither
the friend nor the protégé of any of the chiefs of the army, nor of any politician. That his
name, his Jewish condition, which he didn’t assert or hide, may have slightly hindered
his ascension, it is probable.”23
Esterhazy and Dreyfus. The former failed to enter an elitist school but managed
his way up to the top of the Army in large part due to political connections and
aristocratic partiality. The latter forced himself through France’s highly selective
system, reaching a sound position without the help or support of any superior. Which
model did the Army abide by at large? Both, thus illustrating one of its many
contradictions. The French Army was the product of two traditions: one monarchical,
based on a hierarchical culture; another republican, born from the revolutionary notion
of a nation united in arms.24 At the same time that the Army attracted more Jews it also
became a respectable option for members of the declining aristocracy and the
conservative bourgeoisie, many of whom were profoundly anti-republican. If the Army
became a refuge from the modernization of society it also remained confronted with
fundamental questions: “Where lies duty? Where lies loyalty? Where lies legitimacy?
23
24
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Republic? Empire? Monarchy?”25 Simultaneously, the presence of Jews in the Army
became a parallel source of grievance. The military was considered the only
uncorrupted body of the Republic because it retained links to the Church, the
aristocracy, and the past. How could it accept into its heart men like Dreyfus? Starting
in 1892 the anti-Semitic journal La Libre Parole waged a ferocious campaign against
the presence of Jewish officers in the Army. A number of duels were fought between
Jewish officers and virulent anti-Semites. During one of these, the marquis de Morès, an
anti-Semitic agitator, killed Captain Mayer, a young Jewish officer and the nephew of a
prominent Paris rabbi. The memorial service gathered anywhere between 20,000 and
100,000 people and led to a heated debate over the place of anti-Semitism in French
society.26
If all of Europe experienced a heightening of anti-Semitism during the 1880s, for
a short time France seemed to have remained a safe haven from intolerance. There was
not, for instance, a French delegation at the international anti-Semitic congress of
Dresden in 1882.27 It is unclear why the rest of the decade witnessed the rapid rise of
anti-Semitism. When Union Générale, a Catholic bank founded by Paul Bontox in 1878
to rival Protestant and Jewish banks, crashed at the end of 1881 the Catholic press
blamed Jewish machinations.28 A number of periodicals joined the anti-Semitic camp,
key among them La Croix, founded by Father Bailly in 1880 and funded by the
Assumptionists.29 In 1886 Édouard Drumont published La France Juive (Jewish
France) to account for the invasion of France by over half a million Jews (there were in
fact no more than 110,000 in 1890, including Algerian Jews). In two months, over

25
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100,000 copies were sold and by the end of the century Drumont’s diatribe had joined
Zola’s novels as the top bestseller.30 In 1892 Drumont founded the anti-Semitic daily La
Libre Parole with the subheading “France for the French.” The journal played an
important role in turning the Panama scandal into a national attack on Jewish finance,
which Drumont blamed of having corrupted the government: “The disclosure of
corruption among Deputies and Senators [played] a decisive role in the rise of antiparliamentary, anti-capitalist and anti-Semitic sentiments in France and a dramatic step
forward for the Socialist movement.”31 By the time the Dreyfus Affair began antiSemitism was more than part of the political landscape, it was a key factor.

Before the Dreyfus case turned into a national affair it was an intelligence
incident concerning the national security of France. The Franco-Prussian War had dealt
such a heavy blow to French security and confidence that after 1871 the entirety of the
political and military establishment agreed on the restructuring of the Army based on
the Prussian model. The Ministry of War was reorganized, military expenditure
increased, and “in response to concerns about the European arms race and German
military superiority, as well as the apprehension over a new invasion, a special
Intelligence service (service des renseignements) [was] created devoted to espionage
and counter-espionage.”32 The department, known as the Section de Statistique
(Statistics Section) was secret, its officers were not listed in the Ministry of War, and it
responded directly to the Chief of the General Staff. Located in the rue Saint Dominique
in Paris, near the German Embassy in the rue de Lille, it was well placed to spy on
German diplomats.33 The bureau was at first ineffectual, but in 1887 it came under the
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command of a new chief, Colonel Sandherr, an espionage fanatic. In the summer of
1894 he already headed a small office of five officers – in hierarchical order
commanders Cordier and Henry, captains Lauth and Matton, and an administrator and
archivist, Gribelin – which employed innumerable spies and sources around France and
Europe.
Key among these spies was Marie Bastian, who had been hired by the German
Embassy in 1889 to clean the offices of the building. Madame Bastian would empty
trash cans and deliver the contents to Henry from the Statistics Section.34 It is from
these trash cans that in the summer of 1894 the famous document incriminating Dreyfus
made its way to the high command of the Army. It is still unclear when the so called
bordereau (a note) was received by Henry but the general consensus is that on
September 26, 1894, Henry met with Madame Bastian and discovered the ripped
document among other papers. It was an unsigned, undated letter listing important
military information and addressed to Maximilian von Schwartzkoppen, the German
military attaché in Paris since 1892. On the 27th Henry showed the bordereau to his
colleagues, thereafter concluding that the writer was most probably an artillery officer
on the General Staff with access to important information. That same day General
Mercier, Minister of War, was informed of the discovery by Colonel Sandherr.
Mercier, who had been the target of a press campaign calling for his resignation,
decided to act quickly.35 In the first week of October copies of the document were
handed to the commanding officers of all four bureaus of the General Staff. It was one
of these officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Henri d’Aboville, who on the 6th decided that it
was in fact quite easy to identify the traitor: the information in the bordereau indicated
34
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that he had gone through all four bureaus of the Ministry and only interns were in a
position to do so. Having narrowed the pool of suspects to four or five officers,
d’Aboville’s superior, Colonel Fabre, remembered one of them: Captain Alfred
Dreyfus. Fabre had given him an unfavorable grade in 1893. Fabre and d’Aboville
compared the writing of the bordereau to that of Dreyfus and concluded that the
similarities were striking. Jewish? Alsatian? With some family left in Alsace? Dreyfus
became the perfect traitor. But the bordereau mentioned that its author was about to
leave on maneuvers. Dreyfus hadn’t done so since June, but neither had any other of the
interns from the General Staff. Colonel Fabre then approached the Deputy Chief of the
General Staff, General Gonse, who himself told General Boisdeffre, the Chief of the
General Staff. Sandherr, the anti-Semitic chief of the Statistics Section, was
immediately convinced when informed of the discovery. As for the Minister of War,
General Mercier, he was probably informed on the same day (the 6th) or on the morning
of the 7th. In one day the top ranks of the Army had completed an investigation, found a
traitor who confirmed the prejudices of many, and decided to act without delay.
Convictions before evidence, prejudices above scrutiny, ideology over justice. Of
course, the traitor was a Jewish officer.36
But who was the real spy? On July 20, 1894, Esterhazy visited the German
Embassy in Paris for the first time. Dressed in civilian clothes, he introduced himself to
Schwartzkoppen as an officer on active duty with the French General Staff, who could
provide the Germans with valuable military information. He argued that his family’s
precarious financial situation forced him to act in such a treacherous way. During the
two months or so that followed Esterhazy and Schwartzkoppen met and corresponded
frequently. Esterhazy, who lived beyond his means, who gambled, who had spent his
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wife’s dowry, was in bad need of money. And money was exactly what the German
Empire could provide him with.

By the end of September Esterhazy’s actions had created great turmoil among
the high ranks of the military and the leading figures in government. Since the
bordereau involved the German Embassy the Affair had turned into a matter of State.37
General Mercier was unsure how to act, and in the week that followed October 6 he met
with a number of leading figures, not least the President of the Republic, the Prime
Minister, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the military
governor of Paris (the highest military post in France). Caution was prescribed but
Mercier, “Constantly attacked by the nationalistic press, [saw] the advantage he [could]
extract from this affair.”38 At the same time two writing experts were summoned to the
Ministry of War. The first one, Alfred Gobert, an expert close to the Bank of France,
concluded that although the writing was similar it nonetheless presented striking
differences that had to be accounted for. Another expert, Alphonse Bertillon, gave a
‘better’ conclusion: Dreyfus was most probably the author of the bordereau.
In the last days of that week Commander du Paty de Clam, an officer of the 3rd
bureau and a protégé of General Boisdeffre, was charged with staging and executing the
arrest of Dreyfus. An avid fiction reader with a morbid imagination, du Paty envisioned
the theatrical dictation of a letter. On Saturday the 13th Dreyfus received a letter signed
by General Gonse which asked him to present himself on Monday to the office of the
Chief of the General Staff, dressed in civilian clothes. As Dreyfus enjoyed a calm
Sunday with his family du Paty had his plan approved by his superiors. The infamous
dictation that took place on the next day was a well concerted effort by the military
37
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establishment to corner Dreyfus into a confession. Upon entering Boisdeffre’s office
Dreyfus found none other than du Paty, and three civilians standing in the back of the
office. Du Paty then asked him to write a letter – the text of the bordereau – before
interrupting him abruptly at one point to ask why he was trembling. Dreyfus responded
that his hands were slightly cold and continued writing before du Paty finally stopped
and declared: “In the name of the law I arrest you. You stand accused of the crime of
high treason.”

In tracing the development of the Dreyfus Affair it is possible to divide the
period preceding the eruption of the Affair into three stages. The first comprises the
interlude between the arrest of Dreyfus – for that is when the Affair as a personal
injustice truly began – and his incarceration on Devil’s Island; the second the relative
indifference of public opinion that accompanied the end of the Affair, and which
followed into 1897; the third includes the return of the Affair to French political life
thanks to the efforts of Lieutenant-Colonel Georges Picquart, the new chief of the
Statistics Section, and Mathieu Dreyfus, Alfred Dreyfus’ brother.
The first phase of the Affair turned the fate of Captain Dreyfus into a national
sensation when on October 28, a letter addressed to La Libre Parole disclosed that a
Jewish officer had been imprisoned in the Cherche-Midi prison on espionage charges.
On the 29th the newspaper published a brief inquisitive note: “Is it true that a very
important arrest was made by order of the military authority recently? And the person
arrested accused of espionage? If this report is true, why are the military authorities
keeping it absolutely quiet? A response is called for.”39 In the next two days all the
details of the arrest and the incident were made public by different dailies, forcing an
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emergency Cabinet meeting on November 1. The situation was critical. On the one hand
there was the diplomatic possibility of aggravating tensions with Germany, on the other
the risk of domestic uproar and consternation. The campaign against General Mercier
intensified in the first three weeks of November. Fearing for his job, Mercier publicly
declared that he had absolute proof of Dreyfus’ treason while privately pushing for a
quick trial.
But the preliminary investigation moved quite slowly. Under pressure by
Mercier, Sandherr “[instructed] his officers at the Section de Statistique to collect any
espionage-related documents from their archives that could be used against Dreyfus.”40
The court martial of Dreyfus began on December 19, 1894, and lasted four days. On the
first day it was decided that given the nature of the crime and the possible international
repercussions it was necessary to hold a closed session. The prosecution’s case rested
on only one piece of evidence, the bordereau. Fearing an acquittal, du Paty passed on a
sealed envelope containing a Secret Dossier to be reviewed by the judges during their
final day of deliberations. This was not only illegal, it was also carried out in utter
secrecy and kept undisclosed from the defense. The Secret Dossier was returned to du
Paty on December 22, who in turn gave it back to Sandherr, who then passed it to
Mercier. In the hours that followed Dreyfus was unanimously convicted. On the
morning of January 5, 1895, Captain Dreyfus was degraded in the Cour Morland, the
main courtyard of the École militaire (military school) in Paris. About 4,000 troops
were present and a crowd of nearly 20,000 gathered outside to the shouts of ‘Death to
Judas’, ‘Traitor’, ‘Death to the Jews’. Those personalities present, such as “Léon
Daudet and Maurice Barrès [could] recognize a Frenchman. The Jew Dreyfus [was] not
one.”41 Another man was present in that courtyard that morning: Theodor Herzl, a
40
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young Austrian journalist who had long admired France for its humanity and sense of
justice. What a cold January morning to have been in Paris.
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Chapter II
The Fight for Light: Dreyfusards and Anti-Dreyfusards
The trouble is that, instead of being coupled, two feelings,
equally respectable and hardly irreconcilable, have found
themselves in opposition.42
Raise your eyes, raise your head!
The light is up there! Walk!
Victor Hugo43
If one moment of the Dreyfus Affair has entered universal consciousness it is
Émile Zola’s publication of J’accuse on January 13, 1898. As a daring journalistic act,
as an outcry against iniquity, even as a work of striking synthesis, Zola’s letter to Félix
Faure, President of the French Republic, was in many ways the major turning point of
the Dreyfus Affair. It brought into question the legality of Dreyfus’ condemnation; it
united the Dreyfusard camp; it moved the fight for Dreyfus from the legal to the public
sphere; and it gave public opinion a clear choice between two diametrically opposed
camps. After the acquittal of Esterhazy on January 11 the Dreyfusard camp had been
dealt a heavy blow. Unanimously pronouncing Esterhazy’s innocence the court legally
sealed the fate of Captain Dreyfus for a second time. Zola understood the significance
of this legal impasse and resolved to take another path: public condemnation. JeanDenis Bredin writes that “The genius of Zola was to understand that there was, for the
moment, nothing else to expect from the legal conduits, that the only recourse was
public opinion.”44 Zola’s role cannot be underestimated, but addressing his contribution
to the Dreyfusard movement is not as straightforward as a reading of J’accuse may
seem. Dealing with a text of almost epic proportions is a complicated task, but the
42
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significance of J’accuse can only be understood once the intricacies of the intellectual
context in which it was conceived and elevated have been unraveled. Even though it is
difficult to separate the text from its immediate success, it is only through an analysis of
the former’s conception that one can understand the intellectual milieu behind J’accuse.
No text is separate from its history, but Zola’s act was only deemed heroic because of
what it signified for the Dreyfusards. To an analysis of this relationship we must now
turn.

It would be difficult to determine at what point the Dreyfusard camp was born.
The truth of the matter is that the overwhelming majority of public opinion, along with
most intellectuals, politicians, journalists and writers, believed in Dreyfus’ guilt at the
end of his 1894 trial. Hadn’t a military court unanimously declared him guilty? Weren’t
the Government and the newspapers convinced of his treason? Even if some figures,
among them Zola, were disgusted by the anti-Semitism the trial had sparked in the last
months of 1894, leading up to the degradation of January 5, 1895, no one publicly
doubted the truthfulness of the sentence. Needless to say, from the moment Dreyfus was
accused and imprisoned only a handful of personalities were convinced of his
innocence. The first Dreyfusards, if the term can be aptly used at this point, were Alfred
Dreyfus’ two brothers, Léon and Mathieu, along with his wife Lucie. During the
agonizing weeks of December 1894 and January 1895, Lucie and Mathieu knocked on
all possible doors, talked to as many people as were willing to listen. The Dreyfus
family was quickly joined by the prominent criminal lawyer Edgar Demange, who upon
hesitation took up the case – “Catholic, conservative, led on by many of the prejudices
shared by the accusers of Dreyfus, he…only [saw] the violations of the law, the fragility
of the accusation, the risk of an atrocious judicial error. He… [became] the all devoted
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lawyer of the Jewish officer.”45 By the end of the trial he was convinced of Dreyfus’
innocence, and following the condemnation he made a public declaration in which he
expressed this view without hesitations. Demange, like all other early Dreyfusards,
lacked substantial evidence and was moved more by conviction than by judgment.
Forzinetti, the Governor of the Cherche-Midi military prison where Dreyfus was
imprisoned during his trial, convinced himself on the spot and against all odds that the
Captain was the victim of a judicial mistake. Committed Dreyfusard from that point
onward, he assisted Bernard Lazare in his publication of an 1896 pamphlet defending
Dreyfus.46 It was also from the ranks of the Army that emerged the key detonator in the
rebirth of the Dreyfus Affair: Lieutenant-Colonel Georges Picquart. Picquart was “an
outstanding officer who, although exhibiting anti-Semitic traits, fought fiercely for
justice.”47 Convinced of Esterhazy’s guilt, his investigation turned him into a declared
enemy of the anti-Dreyfusard camp. Picquart showed that one could be both an antiSemite and a Dreyfusard. It is important to note that for a small minority the judicial
irregularities surrounding Dreyfus’ arrest remained more important than his creed.
During the first stages of the Affair, Dreyfus’ supporters asked only for a
revision of the December 1894 sentence. Revisionism was initially a position concerned
with the review of a legal matter. It did not advocate an ideological position or make
clear a set of political goals. Instead, it was centered on the belief that the irregularities
surrounding the degradation and condemnation of Dreyfus made the 1894 trial unjust. A
new trial was thus in order. If revisionism was the first objective of the Dreyfusards,
during the end of 1897 and the beginning of 1898 it emerged as part of a larger fight
against anti-Semitism, militarism, nationalism and conservatism. To further complicate
the issue, revisionism meant different things at different times. First it meant a new trial,
45
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but at the end of 1897 it came to be concerned with Esterhazy’s trial (the condemnation
of Esterhazy would have opened the door for the retrial of Dreyfus). As Dreyfusard
discourse gained ideological coherence and strength during 1898, revisionism lost its
distinctive legal character. All Dreyfusards were for a revision, but not all revisionists
were committed ideological Dreyfusards.
This tightly knit group was united by either moral or personal convictions, but it
was Lazare who became the first public Dreyfusard before all other writers or
journalists. If other initial Dreyfusards were unlikely allies of the Dreyfusard cause –
Demange a conservative jurist; Forzinetti and Picquart officers in the Army that had
convicted Dreyfus – Lazare, on the other hand, was an intellectual who took pride in
being Jewish, and who had already addressed French anti-Semitism in the past. Before
Lazare revisionism was hardly an intellectual movement. It is usually forgotten that by
1896-1897, when the Affair eventually resurfaced, the Dreyfusards were not united by
political motives. The few figures on the side of the Jewish Captain were simply
convinced of his absolute innocence, and the arguments they used were far from those
that made their way into Dreyfusard discourse with the coming of Zola and other
prominent intellectuals in 1898. And yet, if the Dreyfusards were not an ideologically
heterogeneous group, Lazare provided the supporters of Dreyfus with a specific
nemesis. His public disputes with Drumont, expressed in the dialogue between Le
Voltaire and La Libre Parole, along with their subsequent duel, were the starting points
in the separation between what later emerged as the Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard
groups. If the divisions were not clear at the time he published Une erreur judiciaire,
they were nonetheless beginning to emerge as foundations for later intellectual
developments. When one tries to understand how Zola took the fight for Dreyfus from
the judicial into the public realm, it is important to note that this process had started
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almost two years earlier in the writings of Bernard Lazare, who prided himself on
having been “The first Jew who stood up for the Jew.”48 Lazare was the first in a list of
Dreyfus partisans; for if the Dreyfusard camp existed from the early stages of the Affair,
it only became an intellectual, ideological and political movement with the gradual
incorporation of prominent individuals.

Key among these, Émile Zola was a respected figure and an established writer at
the time of the Dreyfus Affair: “He [was] then an accomplished literary man, a tranquil
and rich bourgeois, who [seemed] happy. He [dreamt] of being finally elected to the
French Academy, the ultimate social consecration that [seemed] to be missing.”49 Zola
seems to have been in Rome during the Dreyfus trial, soon after taking some interest in
the virulent anti-Semitism the trial had ignited. His first article in Le Figaro relating to
the Affair, For the Jews, dates from May 26, 1896, and it is an attack on the antiSemitism sparked by the Dreyfus case. Later on, in November of that same year,
Bernard Lazare had tried to persuade Zola of Dreyfus’ innocence. Unconvinced, Zola’s
awareness was sparked a year later, “In November 1897, Zola [had] met Lazare again,
he [had] seen Scheurer-Kestner, he [had] compared the writings, he [had] read the
documents, he [had] begun to accumulate information.”50 Converted to the Dreyfusard
cause, he decided to act.
Taken from a 1994 colloquium entitled “The representations of the Dreyfus
Affair in the press in France and abroad,” Zola and his representations of the Affair
looks at the importance of Zola’s contribution in the elaboration of a particular
ideological discourse akin to the lens of the emerging Dreyfusard camp. Béatrice
Laville argues that even before J’accuse Zola was already formulating a position in
48
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which he saw himself as a kind of national savior, a man of convictions fighting on the
side of light: “From this point onwards, the idea of a sick France, corroded by an ulcer,
a cancer, a gangrene, develops in the Zolaesque and Dreyfusard imagery, at the same
time as the pre-figuration of the intellectual as liberator and therapist.”51 Although
Laville does not analyze the use and impact of such imagery in J’accuse, partly as a
reaction to the over-analysis of the text, partly because of different interests, she
nonetheless makes the important argument that the article was in no way a spontaneous
work as many historians have argued. Zola may have indeed written it in great haste and
frantic fervor, but the ideas and imagery one finds in the letter are the result of a
particular vision of France born out of an older political conviction that the Republic
needed to be saved from its worst enemies.
Before addressing J’accuse one should identify the recurrence of particular
themes in the texts that preceded its publication on January 13, 1898. In a letter from
November 20, 1897, Zola writes to Scheurer-Kestner: “I don’t know what I will do, but
never has human drama filled me with more poignant emotion. It is the combat for
truth, and it is the only good one, the only great one. Even in seeming defeat, victory is
to the end, certain.”52 On November 25 Le Figaro inaugurated Zola’s involvement in
the Affair by publishing an article entitled M. Scheurer-Kestner. In it, Zola is still
cautious, but the grand themes of J’accuse are already there, timidly no doubt, but all
the same present. “I have said it, the affair itself, I don’t want to deal with it,”53 and a
few lines later he adds: “Magistrates make mistakes, military men can make mistakes.
How is the honor of the army engaged in this? Its unique role, if a mistake was made, is
51
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to repair it.”54 Zola also takes up the charge against anti-Semitism, “The press is a
necessary force; I think in sum that it does more good than bad. But certain journals are
not less guilty, some throwing into panic, others terrorizing; living off scandals to triple
their sales. The imbecile anti-Semitism has propelled this folly,”55 and ends the article
with the famous “the truth is on the march, and nothing shall stop it.”56 His next article
in Le Figaro, Le syndicat (The Syndicate), dates from December 1. The title is an ironic
reference to the supposed association of Jewish wealth that was attacking the Army. A
number of newspapers shaped the idea of an underground movement bent on freeing
Dreyfus and betraying France. In their view, figures such as Lazare, Scheurer-Kestner,
Fozinetti, Picquart, and so on, were on the payroll of the Dreyfus family and other
wealthy Jewish families. Zola discards the idea as absurd, but in doing so praises the
Syndicate if there really is one, as a force for justice, liberty and truth: “A Syndicate to
act on public opinion, to heal it of the follies into which the awful press has thrown it, to
bring it back to its senses, to its generosity.”57 This article comes closer to Zola’s views
than the one on Scheurer-Kestner. It displays powerful images: Lazare works for light;
Scheurer-Kestner is tortured by the need for truth and justice; Picquart walks on his
side; all come from the four corners of the universe, walking on different roads, silent
but arriving on the same morning: “A judicial error has been made and as long as it is
not repaired, France will suffer, sickly, as from a secret cancer that bit by bit corrodes
the flesh. And if, to re-establish its health there are certain parts to cut, let them cut
them!”58
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Zola’s diatribes in Le Figaro caused such uproar among the subscribers that
fearing a dramatic drop in sales, the Editor-in-Chief, Fernand de Rodays, was forced to
put an end to them. Zola was only able to publish a third and final article, Procès-verbal
(minutes of a proceeding) on December 5. With the opening of a general military
inquiry on Esterhazy, Zola seeks to address the entire case in succinct form. His style is
no longer that of an artist – M. Scheurer-Kestner – or an ironist – The syndicate – but of
a devoted Dreyfusard. Zola openly attacks the role of the press and the resurgence of
anti-Semitism; he ends the article in expectation: “Let us hope that tomorrow’s
spectacle will give us back our courage and console us.”59 If Zola’s contribution to the
Dreyfusard cause had only begun, Le Figaro’s was fast coming to an end. Never again
throughout 1898 and 1899 would its pages carry such denunciations of French society,
such passionate calls for justice. On January 22, 1898, not even ten days after J’accuse,
Saint-Genest would write: “The love of the army is at all the times like the love of the
fatherland…I have a right to discard Émile Zola’s manifesto.”60 But Zola was quick to
look elsewhere for new allies.
With no newspaper willing to publish his inflammatory articles, Zola turned to
his editor, Eugène Fasquelle, and issued two pamphlets written as letters, one to the
youth, one to France. The Letter to the Youth came out on December 14 in response to
the student riots outside Scheurer-Kestner’s home. Recalling the heroic role of students
during the Second Empire – their determined opposition in the Latin Quarter – Zola
invokes the recurring images of the Dreyfus Affair: “But the youth is already
gangrenous, since its purity, its natural candor, does not allow it to recognize itself in
the middle of unacceptable errors, and go straight into what is evident, what is limpid,
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what is filled with the honest light of plain day!”61 Anti-Semitism is described as a
poison and France’s history is exalted in the face of adversity. How, asks Zola, can the
country of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the ultimate act of tolerance and
emancipation, enter the twentieth century in such a way? The impassioned repetitions of
“Youth, youth!” seem to announce the declaratory “J’accuse;” the call for truth and
justice with which the letter ends echoing “the truth is on the march, and nothing shall
stop it,” from a few weeks earlier. On January 7, 1898, Zola issued his second
pamphlet, Letter to France. At this point Esterhazy was to be judged, but Zola resolved
to write a second letter calling for the renewal of France. As the savior of previous
writings, he again appears as an intellectual liberator. Impersonating France as a fragile
and sickly being, lost in a labyrinth of lies and deceptions, of obscurity and reaction, he
calls for it to be “the great France”62 again, to find itself, to reestablish its honor and
glory, to heal and mend.
In analyzing the texts of Zola’s involvement in the Affair that preceded J’accuse
one finds a clear set of motifs. The novelist merges with the social critic, the social
critic with the healer. The uproar of J’accuse is already there, along with the pleas for
light, truth and justice. The echoes of 1789 resonate in the writing, both as political
indicators and as evidence of France’s potential for good. Zola’s combat for Dreyfus
was recent, but this did not make it any less ardent. In a few weeks he had gone from
slightly doubting the verdict of 1894 to denouncing the obscurity of the age. His entire
life’s oeuvre, as a monument to social injustice and human iniquity, came to life in the
lines of these articles and letters that preceded the acquittal of Esterhazy on January 11.
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However, it was J’accuse that became the definitive version of Zola’s fight; the acme of
Dreyfusard discourse.

Texts cannot be separated from the events surrounding them. If Zola’s articles
and pamphlets up to J’accuse had caught the attention of the government and public
opinion, they did not represent a major threat to the assertion that Dreyfus was in fact
guilty and that a retrial was out of the question. All of these documents were no doubt
impassioned, but one cannot forget that the legal pathways had yet to be closed. If
anything, the last month of 1897 was a highpoint for the few supporters of Dreyfus.
Against all odds, and in the face of overwhelming opposition, the Esterhazy trial had
become a reality. Whereas a revision of 1894 was legally impossible, a court finding
Esterhazy guilty would revive the way for the reopening of the Dreyfus case. Most
Dreyfusards had high hopes in the military court that convened on January 10 and 11. If
anything, Zola, unlike most Dreyfusards, did not believe in a positive verdict63 and on
January 10 he began to write the famous letter to the President of the French Republic.
Part of J’accuse’s success may well be that it appeared at the right time. Had Zola
waited for the verdict and then decided to act, the impact of the article would have been
less powerful. Although the letter was felt as a spontaneous cry at the acquittal of
Esterhazy, in reality it had been prepared for quite some time. Its themes were those of
Zola’s previous writings, the evidence an accumulation of information in the last days
preceding its publication. Zola did work in haste, but J’accuse must be understood both
as a culmination of Zolaesque ideas and as an impulsive belief in the mistake that had
been committed.
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Working for two days, Zola finished the letter during the night of the eleventh
and the morning of the twelfth.64 A number of factors external to the content of the
article contributed to its success. Although intended to follow his previous two letters,
Zola understood the Affair needed to become a press happening, and that this third letter
needed a newspaper. With most doors closed he turned to L’Aurore, a left-wing daily
that had only been founded in October 1897. Georges Clemenceau, the Editor-in-Chief,
had initially, like most others, been unfavorable to a revision. He had accepted Bernard
Lazare as a contributor under the condition that he would keep quiet about the Affair.
On November 1, 1897, he had written an article asking: “Is it really impossible to finish
off once and for all with this story? Dreyfus was judged by his peers, and declared
guilty. We must hold the judgment as good until new orders.”65 Like Zola, during
November he took a closer look at the Affair, he met with Scheurer-Kestner and he
slowly came to see the great iniquity. In the last two months of 1897 L’Aurore swiftly
converted to the Dreyfusard cause. It was in fact Clemenceau who on the evening of
January 12 made two of the key decisions impacting the success of J’accuse. First, he
changed the title from Letter to M. Félix Faure, President of the Republic to J’accuse,
the recurring statement of the final section. Second, he decided to have 300,000 copies
of L’Aurore, ten times its usual circulation, printed exceptionally the following day.
Its immediacy, the number of copies sold, the title, all are nonetheless secondary
when one addresses the importance of J’accuse as the founding text of the Dreyfusard
movement. In acknowledging that the legal road had been closed, the letter took up the
fight for justice in the public realm; it gave names to the perpetrators of injustice; it
delineated the series of mistakes and irregularities committed by the Army and the
government; it crystallized the divisions between the Dreyfusards and the anti64
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Dreyfusards. Addressing an open letter to the President of the Republic, perhaps not the
most powerful government figure but without doubt the highest State figure, was in
itself deemed an audacious act. Zola begins by spelling out the glories of fin-de-siècle
France and stating: “But what a stain of mud on your name – I was going to say on your
reign – than this abominable Dreyfus affair!”66 He then tells the story of Dreyfus’
condemnation, from the moment the bordereau was discovered to the quick conviction
of 1894. For Jean-Denis Bredin “he exaggerates the importance of Du Paty whom he
wrongfully places in the first rank. He forgets to mention Henry, the principal criminal
instrument. He minimizes the role of General Gonse. He doesn’t notice the essential
responsibility of General Mercier.”67 Nonetheless, Zola did what no one of his stature
had done up to that point: tell the story of Dreyfus. Zola mentions names, crimes,
irregularities, and more importantly he accuses the General Staff of a “crime, whose
abomination grows with every hour.”68 He attacks the resolution of the second war
council which set Esterhazy free, and declares it an offense “to exploit patriotism for
works of hatred.”69
Zola repeats the powerful statement “the truth is on the march, and nothing shall
stop it,”70 before ending his letter with the famous interpolations “J’accuse,”
denouncing Lieutenant-Colonel Paty du Clam, Generals Mercier, Billot, Boisdeffre,
Gonse, and Pellieux, Commander Ravary, the war ministry’s bureaus and the two war
councils, as well as the three writing experts that declared Dreyfus to be the writer of
the bordereau – Belhomme, Varinard, and Couard. He acknowledges the implications
of such accusations under the defamatory press laws and concludes with a call for
‘light’: “I only have one passion, that of light, in the name of humanity, which has
66

Émile Zola, « J’accuse, » in Combat pour Dreyfus, ed. Alain Pagès (Paris: Éditions Dilecta, 2006), 81.
Bredin, L’Affaire, 341.
68
Zola, « J’accuse, » in Combat pour Dreyfus, 90.
69
Ibid., 93.
70
Ibid., 95.
67

34

suffered so greatly and which is entitled to happiness.”71 Bredin argues that “Zola
[discovered] the very essence of the Affair. He [saw] all the springs of the judicial error,
committed, then covered, then maintained…The hierarchical exasperation, the cult of
the fatherland and the honor of the corps, he [saw] the clerical passion, as well as the
conspiracy of the fooled mob and of the fiery governments, looking at all costs for
silence.”72 More importantly, “Zola was the first one – for Bernard Lazare had not been
able to give his engagement this dimension – to turn the combat for the revision of the
Dreyfus trial into a moral cause, and a republican duty.”73 For Bredin, Zola helped the
enemies of Dreyfus recognize themselves. He clarified the Affair, and in so doing
simplified the divisions between the two camps. He placed truth and justice, the rights
of man and democracy on the side of the Dreyfusards, and left nationalism, Catholicism
and tradition on the side of the Army and its supporters.
Was January 13, 1898, then, the day on which the Affair was born? Hardly,
Dreyfus had been convicted in 1894, the fight for him had been ongoing ever since, and
the fury of anti-Semitism had already made its way through French discourse. What this
day did represent was the transferal of the debates from the legal into the public realm.
For those who thought the law had declared itself in definitive terms for a second time,
J’accuse showed that justice did not solely belong to the courts; it was also the task of
the French nation. “To all those ready to launch campaigns for justice, human rights and
Republican principles; to Nationalist and anti-Semitic groups who [were] to stir up the
whole of France in the coming months,”74 the Affair was born in this text. In response,
Zola received some 30,000 telegrams and letters. To some he became the hero willing to
sacrifice his comfort and respectability for the case of another man; to others he came to
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embody everything that was naïve and dangerous about the Dreyfusard camp. Zola
helped demarcate the borders of the Dreyfusard movement, providing it with an
enlightened imagery to evoke and a revolutionary tradition to exalt.

January 13 was not without its drawbacks for the Dreyfusards. Just as J’accuse
had already sold 200,000 copies, General Billot had Picquart arrested and imprisoned. A
military inquiry was to determine on which grounds he could be tried and dismissed. At
the same time a heated discussion in the Chamber of Deputies led to a vote of
confidence in the Méline Government, with 312 in favor, 122 against and 100
abstentions. Scheurer-Kestner lost his position as Vice-President of the Senate. With
most of the public hostile to revision and elections on the horizon, the overwhelming
political majority remained loyal to the decision of the military court. The Dreyfusard
fight was in fact just about to begin, and in the months that followed, the number of
newspapers open to revision remained minimal. On September 16, 1898, the newspaper
Le Rappel issued a list of newspapers that had been hostile to revision in March 1898 as
opposed to September 1898. Out of forty newspapers surveyed in March, ten had been
for revision, thirty against. In September this number had shifted dramatically, with
twenty six for and fourteen against. In January the situation was all the more precarious.
Furthermore, some of the newspapers with the largest circulation remained faithful to
the anti-Dreyfusard cause. The Assumptionist daily La Croix had a daily circulation of
180,000, not counting its more than 100 local weekly editions.75 As for Le Petit
Journal, the 1890s were the height of its popularity with close to a million copies sold
per day. Both remained profoundly anti-Dreyfusard to the very end.
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If in sheer numbers the anti-Dreyfusards seem to have held the upper hand
throughout 1898, the number of intellectuals who rallied behind the cause of Dreyfus
increased dramatically after the acquittal of Esterhazy and J’accuse. In the two days that
followed, two petitions were issued calling for the revision of the 1894 trial. In sum,
some 2000 signatures were added “including scholars (Edouard Grimaux, Louis Havet,
Paul Viollet, Arthur Guy, Léon Blum, Jean Psichari, Lucien Herr, Anatole France, and
from the French Academy, Elie and David Halévy); writers (Pierre Quillard, Jacques
Bizet, Marcel Proust, Octave Mirbeau, Charles Péguy); artists and poets (Claude Monet,
Eugène Carrière, Ratisbonne, Barbier). Many other intellectuals supported a revision of
the verdict of Dreyfus, including the sociologist Emile Durkheim and Lucien LévyBrühl and the writers André Gide (previously an anti-Semite), Stéphane Mallarmé, Jules
Renard, Julien Benda and Maurice Maeterlinck.”76 Other prominent figures for revision
included Émile Duclaux, director of the Pasteur Institute, Fernand Gregh, Félix Fénéon,
Charles Andler, Victor Bérard, Francois Simiand, Georges Sorel, and the historian
Gabriel Monod. In L’Aurore Clemenceau published the names of the signatories under
the heading “Manifesto of the Intellectuals.”77 If many of these figure were not active in
the fight for Dreyfus, their prominence in French cultural life nevertheless gave an
impulse to the Dreyfusards which had very much been lacking in the last months of
1897.

Before dealing with the development of the Dreyfusard camp it is necessary to
resume an account of the developments of the Dreyfus Affair during the rest of 1898.
Following J’accuse a number of anti-Semitic riots broke out across France – about 70 in
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three weeks.78 They were particularly violent in French Algeria, where Jewish shops
were destroyed and Jews physically attacked. The Dreyfusard press was shocked by the
verbal and physical violence of this wave of anti-Semitism. In the legal realm, on
January 18 General Billot, Minister of War, filed an individual suit against Zola and
Alexandre Perrenx, manager of L’Aurore, for libel and complicity. The trial, which was
quickly penned L’Affaire Zola lasted from February 7 to 23; it was a national sensation
with famous court interruptions and major public disturbances. The defense sought to
take advantage of the trial to show the irregularities in the 1894 Dreyfus and the 1898
Esterhazy trials. The list of witnesses went over 200 and it included all the figures
involved in the Affair during its long duration.79 The prosecution reacted fiercely and
convinced the Presiding Judge, Albert Delegorgue, to limit the trial to Billot’s charge.
Lucie Dreyfus appeared on the first day, “At the first question…the president
[interrupted] the attorney with the formula, that he…thereafter [repeated] hundreds of
times: ‘The question will not be raised’”80 On the last day of the trial, after a succession
of emotional statements, the jurors deliberated for forty minutes before sentencing Zola
to a year in prison and a 3,000 francs fine. The defamation charge was approved with a
majority vote of 8 to 4. Following the trial, and inspired by the injustices committed
against Dreyfus and Zola, the League for the Rights of Man and the Citizen was created.
On February 26 Picquart was dismissed from the Army for serious disciplinary offence
and his pension reduced.81 After presenting the case to an appeals court the judgment of
the Zola trial was declared void on April 2 and a new trial was convened for May; but
after the competence of the Court to try the case was challenged, the retrial was in fact
adjourned until July.
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In the meantime the Méline government was brought down on June 15 for
reasons unrelated to the Dreyfus Affair. Henri Brisson, a radical, formed a new
government, and Godefroy Cavaignac became the new Minister of War. Cavaignac,
who “illustrated a new conception of radicalism, which mixed a passionate nationalism,
a reforming project and the re-vindication of truthful republican virtue,”82 was
determined to crush the Dreyfusard camp, which had gained presence in the press
through revelations of irregularities in the Dreyfus case. Calling for the revision and
reordering of the Secret Dossier, on July 7 Cavaignac gave a determined speech in the
Chamber of Deputies declaring his certainty in Dreyfus’ guilt. He read from three
letters, two of which were frauds (the letter in which a ‘P’ was substituted with a ‘D’,
and the forged faux Henry). On July 13 Picquart was arrested and sent to La Santé, and
on July 18 Zola was again convicted by the appeals court. He fled for England to escape
imprisonment, only to return to France a year later.
If July was a low point for the Dreyfusards, it nonetheless set the stage for the
revision of the 1894 trial. Throughout August Jaurès published a series of articles in the
Dreyfusard newspaper, La Petite République, entitled The Proofs, pointing out the
wrongdoings and lies surrounding the Dreyfus case and the Esterhazy acquittal. The
thirteenth of that month, Captain Cuignet, charged by Cavaignac with examining the
Secret Dossier, discovered the faux Henry to be a forgery. Henry was summoned to
Cavaignac’s office at the end of the month, where he admitted having forged
documents. After taking responsibility and appealing to national security as his prime
motive he was transferred to the Mont-Valérien prison. Boisdeffre immediately
presented his resignation and on August 31 Henry committed suicide. Fearing a new
trial, Esterhazy fled to London via Brussels the following day. On September 3
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Cavaignac presented his own resignation. These events led to a major shift in public
opinion. One by one, newspapers that had been hostile to revision grew convinced that
this was now the only way to clear the name of the Army and the State. Lucie Dreyfus
issued an appeal for revision that reached the Criminal Chamber at the end of
September. Between October 27 and 29 the Chamber reviewed Lucie’s appeal request
and decided that it was valid; a new inquiry was finally opened. In almost a year the
case for revision had gone from a family affair to a matter of State that could only be
resolved by an investigation. For Bredin, during 1898 the demarcation of the frontiers
between Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards was finally fixed.83

If Zola gave the Affair its national character,84 through J’accuse and his
sensational trial, others continued the public plea for Dreyfus throughout 1898. A
distinction must nonetheless be made between those who pursued the legal battle for
revision and those who kept the press alert during the developments of the Affair. This
second group had a small audience, “The rare journals where they [could] write, such as
L’Aurore, Le Siècle, [did] not amount to much in view of the enormous weight of the
anti-Dreyfusard press.”85 And yet, these journalists managed to set the parameters of the
Dreyfusard movement. By the end of 1898 it was almost impossible for political,
cultural or intellectual figures to stay neutral in face of the Affair. Sides were chosen,
ideologies confirmed, and divisions in French society resurfaced through a powerful
evocation of different ideals and values.
Key among the Dreyfusards was Georges Clemenceau. We have already come
across his contribution to J’accuse as Editor-in-Chief of L’Aurore. Moreover, his
hundreds of articles, occupying more than 3,000 pages, place him “in the first ranks of
83

Ibid., 468.
Ibid., 375.
85
Ibid., 383.
84

40

Dreyfusard intellectuals, side by side with Lazare, Zola, and Jaurès.”86 Clemenceau,
whose career had taken him into politics, had been damaged by a series of attacks
during the Panama scandal that cost him his seat in the Chamber of Deputies. Excluded
from political life and unable to return until 1902, he instead turned to writing. It is no
coincidence that his major contribution to the Affair was not the speeches for which he
had once been famous but the hundreds of articles in which he repeatedly exposed the
injustices of the different trials. Clemenceau’s engagement was that of a journalist
combining information with opinion. Unlike the works of Lazare or Jaurès, which
sought to illustrate the innocence of Dreyfus in one gesture, Clemenceau’s articles were
the weekly, sometimes daily attacks of a furious mind which had itself been unjustly
accused and excluded from the political arena a few years earlier. But Clemenceau also
saw beyond the daily developments of the Affair. In compiling all his articles in seven
volumes one can see “the sense of his combat, and of his letter to Alfred Dreyfus on
October 15, 1899: ‘To fight for you is to fight for France.’”87
Supporting Zola throughout January 1898, Clemenceau developed a specific set
of issues that preoccupied him. On the twentieth he wrote: “When the rights of an
individual are undermined, it’s the rights of all that are menaced.”88 The article ends
with an evocation of the burning of the heretic Jean Hus: “It will soon be five hundred
years since this. The names of regimes change. Human ignorance turns obstinate.
Without weakening, let us bring our help to the truth.”89 Coming back to obscurantism
the next day in an article entitled The Crusade Clemenceau sees a “France of the
Revolution against which the entire Papal army, at the present hour, deploys its
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battalions.”90 Without even directly addressing the Dreyfus Affair – there is only a
mention of a Jew condemned for treason – or the Zola case, Clemenceau writes of the
Middle Ages, the Revolution, the government’s corruption and anti-Semitism. It is the
bourgeoisie which is to blame for the return of clericalism, a bourgeoisie eager to
expiate its past faults and come back to the bosom of the Catholic Church. “The
Republican bourgeoisie repudiating the Republic of justice by which it was one day
dazzled, the free thinking bourgeoisie taking its children from the University to deliver
them to the Jesuits,”91 writes Clemenceau before attacking the Church’s envelopment of
the French Army. For him the so called defenders of the Army had only degraded
France to the rank of a country like Spain. On January 27, following the anti-Jewish
riots of Algiers, Clemenceau made a passionate case against anti-Semitism in the article
Death to the Jews: “The anti-Jewish uprisings in Algiers, where Europeans and
Indigenous populations fraternized in murder, fire and pillage show under what thin
varnish of civilization hides our barbarity.”92 Attacking the response of the government
and society he wrote, “This takes place in French territory, under the Third Republic,
with this inscription on the walls: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.”93 For the passionate
Republican these events foreshadowed greater calamities, embodying the refusal of an
epoch to recognize its injustices. The anti-Dreyfusards seemed to personify the spirit of
the time. Detached from the triumphs of Republicanism, the bourgeoisie and the
ignorant mob had united behind the forces of reaction. Dreyfus was not only the victim
of a judicial mistake or a military plot; he was the sacrificial lamb of an era unable to
recognize its ignorance and prejudices.
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On January 29 he finished his article: “Measure this as the retreat of the French
spirit.”94 In a few weeks the Dreyfusards had turned the Dreyfus Affair into a
microcosm of French history. What did Clemenceau mean by a “French spirit”? How
was the Dreyfus Affair contrary to this spirit? In most of his January and February
articles Clemenceau evokes a specific idea of France. In a few weeks, to defend this
idea and to defend Dreyfus had become synonymous. It was not only a matter of
individual injustice, but a realization of everything that was wrong with France. How
could the nation of 1789, how could a Republic based on the Declaration of the Rights
of Man, condemn a man unjustly and justify itself behind religion and nationalism? One
defended Dreyfus because one was against the Catholic Church and for the separation
between Church and State; against discrimination and for universal human rights;
against the raison d’État and for individual justice; against militarism and for freedom
of action; against Rome and for 1789; against the Bastille and for the Republic.
Clemenceau, prominent among the Dreyfusards, pushed through with a verbal impetus
that evoked all these themes and identified the anti-Dreyfusards along strict obscurantist
lines.
On February 23 he published an account of the last day of the Zola trial. His
closing speech summarized these ideas quite forcefully: “It is the negation of the French
idea that came out of the Revolution, the idea of the same liberty for all, the idea of
tolerance for all.”95 Even though Clemenceau was no lawyer the court made an
exception by granting him the right to pronounce the final statement in favor of
L’Aurore. Suggesting the supposed treason of Dreyfus he stated that “the worst
treason…is the treason of the French spirit, of the French spirit which has acquired such
a good reputation in the world, of the spirit of tolerance and justice which once got us
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the love of all the peoples of the earth. For even if France was to disappear tomorrow,
there will remain of it an eternal thing, the sentiments of liberty and human justice that
it unraveled in the world in 1789.”96 If he attached France to a specific republican
ideology, Clemenceau was also keen to reject another tradition, that of a strong
authoritarian State: “Make this respect, absurd as it is in a democracy, of the raison
d’État, disappear from our souls. The raison d’État can be seen with Louis XIV, with
Napoleon, with the men who hold a people in their hands and the government according
to their liking.”97 And then, he proceeded to summarize the main concept of the French
State with which the Dreyfusards were to be associated from that moment onward: “In a
democracy, the raison d’État is nothing but a contradiction, a vestige of the past.
Gambetta use to say that France is a high moral being. I don’t deny anything of France,
Monarchy or Republic. But I say that the tradition of the raison d’État has had its time
and that the time has come for us to attach ourselves to the modern idea of liberty and
egalitarian justice….an example for all civilized nations.”98 If Zola had crystallized the
divisions made apparent by the Dreyfus Affair, Clemenceau had brought them to a
riveting conclusion. The destiny of Captain Dreyfus had been linked to that of the
Enlightenment, and the Enlightenment’s to France. France was not only a nation
demarcated by territorial borders; it was a model for humanity. The end of
Clemenceau’s speech was met with applause and clamors, but the court was to decide
otherwise. On February 23 it found Zola guilty and sentenced him to the maximum
sentence for libel. Both inside and outside the courtroom anti-Dreyfusards cheered in
support of the verdict. The legal road had again been shut down, but the trial had also
been an opportunity to call attention to the Affair, both nationally and internationally.
Clemenceau was to continue his fight for years to come, but especially in that difficult
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year of 1898 when his constant articles gave hope and guidance to the Dreyfusard
movement.

The period between J’accuse and the opening of the inquiry on October 29
proved to be the intellectual breaking point of the Dreyfus Affair. The prime objective
was to reopen the case of Captain Dreyfus: “It was, and remained so for some. But for
many, throughout 1898, the perspective [became] vaster, vaguer too.”99 If a distinction
had been rapidly constructed between justice and patriotism, “Justice, the fatherland,
Dreyfus [could not] oppose them or separate them.”100 For at the heart of the intellectual
developments of that crucial year remained a profound paradox: Dreyfus had been
separated from the Affair. Zola may have been tormented by such a case of individual
injustice, but for many who rallied behind the Dreyfusards his plea pointed to a general
malaise that could only be mended through confrontation. The opposites that were
espoused by either camp made their way into political discourse, especially after the
May 1898 elections. Bredin argues that “the division of interests and of ideas that ran, in
the political world, starting at the end of 1898, and more so in 1899, broadly separating
a Dreyfusard left from an anti-Dreyfusard right, took place around the grand oppositions
the intellectuals had traced.”101 If the Dreyfusards took the lead in creating a specific
language of opposition to the State, the dialogue between the two camps was by no
means one-sided. The anti-Dreyfusards developed their own list of ideals. In a few
months the two seemed diametrically opposed. To this relationship we must now turn.

On December 31, 1898, almost a year after the publication of J’accuse, a group
of prominent personalities founded the Ligue de la Patrie française (League of the
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French Fatherland) to assemble and coordinate the efforts of the anti-Dreyfusards. If at
the start of 1898 they relied on the vast support of anti-revisionist opinion, their effort
could nevertheless not compare with the Dreyfusards’ organizational prowess. In fact,
they took much longer to coordinate collective action.102 When their response came, it
demonstrated that not all intellectuals and academics were supporters of Dreyfus. The
name of the League was a direct response to the Dreyfusard Ligue des droits de
l’homme founded earlier that year. At the initiative of a few young academics, and
under the leadership of Francois Coppée, Jules Lemaitre, and Maurice Barrès, the
League gathered the support of 22 members of the Académie Française, several dozen
members of the Institut, hundreds of university professors, writers, magistrates, doctors
and other members of the liberal professions.103 An appeal published in the Royalist
daily Le Soleil bore the signatures of anti-Semitic personalities such as Charles Maurras,
Léon Daudet and Gyp (Countess Martel de Janville), while also including the editor of
the Revue des Deux Mondes Ferdinand Brunetière, the poet Frédéric Mistral, and Jules
Verne. Other early supporters were scholars Henri Vaugeois, Louis Dausset and Gabriel
Syveton, historians Albert Vandal, Petit de Julleville, cartoonists Forain and Caran
d’Ache, and the painters Jean Renoir and Paul Degas.104
The text published was in some ways vague. It did not mention Dreyfus or any
other figure involved in the Affair. It sought to unite rather than attack, and it briefly
described the importance of national cohesion. Acknowledging the seriousness of the
political and social tensions evident at the end of 1898 it stated that “it could not
continue without fatally compromising the vital interests of the French Fatherland, and
notably those which are gloriously held in trust by the nation’s army.”105 Aligning the
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fate of the Army with that of France the text went on: “Convinced that in so saying they
are expressing the opinion of France itself.”106 A few more lines invoked the link
between “the traditions of the French Fatherland,” and “the progress of ideas and social
customs.”107 The closing statement ensured a connection between an unclear past and an
abstract future: “To fortify the spirit of solidarity which should unite, through the years,
every generation of a great people.”108 The letter is interesting, as much as for what is
stated as for what is not. Amidst a conciliatory tone it develops an abstract notion of
what it means to be French. Solidarity, union, cohesion, tradition, respect; all are
presented as virtues of the “Fatherland.” No anti-Semitism, no political attacks, no
divisive issues are to be found. Far from J’accuse and its legal specificity, the initial
open letter from the League was an intellectual act which sought to present a new image
of the anti-Dreyfusards. Insofar as Zola and Clemenceau had taken the torch away from
the anti-Dreyfusards, the fight was now to recover it. The letter was short but it
resonated across French society because of the names that were attached to it. AntiSemites mingled with artists, academicians with writers. Only one politician,
Cavaignac, signed the text. In this sense, the act was portrayed as an apolitical appeal
for calm and unity.
In his analysis of the Dreyfus Affair Christophe Charle argues that the petition of
the League sought to distance itself from the Henry petition issued by La Libre Parole.
Drumont had launched an appeal to assist Henry’s widow finance a trial against Joseph
Reinach – who had written a number of articles accusing Henry of being Esterhazy’s
main supporter inside the Army. Drumont saw this as an opportunity to gather
momentum against the Dreyfusards. The number of donors rose above 14,000 after a
month, and many of the contributions sent to La Libre Parole were accompanied by
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virulent anti-Semitic commentaries. When a couple of weeks later Barrès supervised the
publication of the League’s letter, he wanted the differences between the extremist antiSemites and the rest of the antirevisionist camp to be clarified. Not only was the text’s
tone conciliatory, but the very manner in which the signatures were organized was
closely supervised in order to evoke a specific idea of France. In the Henry petition “the
individuals disappeared behind the sums of money assembled. In the first lists of the
League, at least, the signatures are systematically regrouped by corporation, a way of
summing up society which is, according to Barrès’ organic vision, not a collection of
individuals, but an association of professions intertwined between them by common
national values.”109 In this sense, the 22 members of the French Academy who signed
the petition were placed first because the institution they represented was the oldest in
the list, founded by none other than Cardinal Richelieu. The order of the 22 names was
not set out according to the extent of each individual’s engagement in the Affair, but in
relation to seniority and age. Following the academicians were the scholars, artists and
doctors, leaving the writers at the end. University members were subsequently
organized in alphabetical order without any geographical considerations. This meant
that Parisian and provincial faculty members were placed on the same level. Within this
clear structure the League sought to create an image of social order which was very
much lacking in previous Dreyfusard petitions or in the Henry subscription list: “The
promoters of the League of the French Fatherland wanted to initially lead a highly
concerted operation, defend order within order.”110 More importantly, they wanted to
“distinguish the list from the rather anarchical spontaneity of the Dreyfusards or from
the hype of Drumont.”111 For the Dreyfusards each individual had equal weight, a
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profession bearing no influence on where a name should appear. The League refrained
from what it thought was an anarchical choice.
This material distinction between different petitions is not analogous to the
actual configuration and inclinations of the different camps of the Dreyfus Affair, but it
can shed light on the fundamental departures the bulk of anti-Dreyfusards took after the
publication of J’accuse. For Zola, for Clemenceau, even for Jaurès and the Socialists,
the case of Dreyfus was significant because it illustrated the injustice inflicted upon an
individual. The petitions seemed to mirror this echo of individuality in their
‘disorganized’ positioning of diverse figures. The outcry of the Dreyfusards was a
collective activity but its objective was the liberation of one individual. The fact that
such grandiose imagery was evoked in the plea of one Captain is not paradoxical, far
from it; it is the manifestation of general Enlightenment ideas that turned the fate of the
individual into the test for general justice. If one individual suffered at the hands of the
political system then the entire nation suffered with him. Individuals, let alone Dreyfus,
or even Henry, play no part in the League’s text. The signatories are part of a body that
is representative of organic hierarchies within society. And yet, it would nonetheless be
unsuitable to argue that the anti-Dreyfusard camp was centered on this notion. Hadn’t
Drumont and the anti-Semites issued a petition to help restore the reputation of the late
Henry? Was their effort not, in spite of its political implications, particular in intent? It
is tempting to strike a division between these two seeming subgroups of the antiDreyfusard camp. And yet, if the divisions between Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards
were in no way self-evident before 1898, it would be naïve to argue that they never
existed. It is all the same important to acknowledge that one could at once be against the
revision of the Dreyfus case and profoundly attached to the judicial entreaties of
individuals. To be an anti-Dreyfusard did not mean that one was against individuality
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and the Enlightenment; but as 1898 progressed the anti-Dreyfusard bloc created a
specific image of itself that was in most ways opposed to the Revolution of 1789. As the
text of the League shows, this image was not always clearly defined. Since the Republic
could not easily be used to make political arguments, it was thus both the Army and the
specificity of the French situation that permeated most anti-Dreyfusard discourse.

For the majority of anti-Dreyfusards it was the concrete case of the Army that
resonated the most. France was not structured around the military in the way Prussia
had been for the few centuries leading up to the unification of Germany. However, the
Army played a pivotal social and ideological role at the turn of the Affair. The 1870
disastrous defeat against Prussia had traumatized the French nation during the first
decades of the Third Republic. Throughout the 1870s a number of laws provided the
Army with necessary tools to implement reforms, as well as to modernize and
reorganize its technologies and structure. The improvements were dramatic, but “this
renewal of the Army, this seduction that it [exercised], [could not] dissimulate the
profound crisis that [stroke] it, a moral crisis, an intellectual crisis.”112 The Army had
long been the embodiment of conservative ideas. Now that the regime had changed it
faced new questions: What is the role of the Army in a democracy founded on universal
suffrage, a parliamentary system, public schooling, and compulsory military service?
What is its mission?113 In many ways the Army had become the last true State bastion
of the extreme right: the royalists, the aristocracy and the anti-Semites desired military
careers that would emulate the values they deeply cherished. The ideas that ran through
its ranks were the ideas of these groups, and although the Army had been incorporated
into the Third Republic as an agent for eventual revenge against Germany, it remained a
112
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body detached from Republican values, instead attached to Church, discipline, order
and strict social hierarchies.
The Army represented strong anti-Dreyfusard support groups such as Catholics,
the old nobility, the royalists, the anti-Semites, and yet, many of its supporters were
closer to more moderate sections of the anti-Dreyfusard bloc. Eric Cahm makes an
important distinction between what he terms moderate anti-Dreyfusism and extremist
anti-Dreyfusism. The first group encompassed many members of the government who
saw the antirevisionist side as the most Republican of the two, since it did not seek to
weaken the rising Third Republic. The Republican press adhered to this view, along
with large segments of the liberal minded bourgeoisie. The second group included the
anti-Semitic press as well as anti-Republican thinkers: “The only conviction they shared
was that of Dreyfus’ guilt.”114 Barrès falls in the second category, along with Maurras
and Drumont, but his ideas also influenced the discourse of the moderate antiDreyfusards. The League for instance “was thus from the outset a partisan body, and it
attempted to combine the incompatible moderate and extremist versions of antiDreyfusism.”115 The League had little medium-term success, and both Barrès and
Maurras moved on to assemble more extremist anti-Dreyfusards for the creation of the
new nationalism of the extreme right.116 However, it is possible to trace certain
Barrèsian themes in the articles and editorials that related to the Dreyfus Affair
throughout 1898.
Le Figaro was a classical liberal newspaper. Confident in the country’s
institutions, it was a proponent of economic liberalism, ideological moderation and
order. Zola had published his initial articles in it, but throughout the rest of 1898 the
shift was to the moderate anti-Dreyfusard camp. Opposed to disturbances and
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revolutions from both left and right, Le Figaro was equally hostile to anti-Semitic
disturbances – “French society was proud to be considered a school of perfectionism,
and Paris was proud to pass for the household of the world,”117 – and to Dreyfusard
disorder: “It is the social revolution that surfaces, it is the fight against capitalist society,
against the old society that we are.”118 If at first the newspaper was strongly antiDreyfusard, anti-Semitism and radical nationalism are nowhere to be found on its pages.
With the discovery of the forged documents, Henry’s suicide, Esterhazy’s exile, and so
on, it became more neutral in its positions, keeping faith in the Army and lamenting the
divisions in France. The shift is apparent in Cornély’s weekly editorials, although some
passages seem to echo Barrès in their nationalistic splendor: “For the peoples who are
fortunate enough that military discipline be the prolongation of national discipline, the
army will remain the conservatory and the school of application of the nation’s
virtues,”119 or a few months later on the Army, “It is what is purest and strongest in
France. Those who attack it are crazy. Their insanity consists of their wanting to render
the entire military corpus, the very institutions, responsible for the mistakes of certain
individuals.”120
The lines between moderate and extremist anti-Dreyfusism are thus sometimes
blurry. And yet, anti-Semitism seems to be the defining factor between the two. If one
ventures into La Libre Parole, to which we will turn in the following chapter, extremist
anti-Dreyfusard discourse departs significantly because of its virulent anti-Semitism. If
this is perhaps the defining distinction between these two sub-groups, we must turn to
Barrès and Drumont in order to understand in which ways anti-Semitic discourse and its
underlying implications sheds light on the fundamental divisions of the Dreyfus Affair.
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Chapter III
The State and the Individual: the Case of Dreyfus
Hannah Arendt was only eight when World War I broke out in the summer of
1914. Many summers later, in 1950, she completed her grand work The Origins of
Totalitarianism. In the preface to the first edition she refused to invoke a lost
springtime: “We can no longer afford to take that which is good in the past and simply
call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by
itself time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean stream of Western history has finally
come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in which
we live. And this is why all efforts to escape from the grimness of the present into
nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are
vain.”121 Arendt was 44 years old when she wrote these words, and like millions of
others had lived through “two world wars in one generation, separated by an
uninterrupted chain of local wars and revolutions,”122 and the beginning of the Cold
War. As a Jew she had to flee Germany in 1933, moving around Europe before reaching
New York in 1941. Even though The Origins of Totalitarianism remains a seminal work
of political philosophy, its outlook is also deeply embedded in the collapse of European
sanity during the first half of the twentieth century.
As Arendt writes in the preface to the first edition, “This book has been written
against a background of both reckless optimism and reckless despair. It holds that
Progress and Doom are two sides of the same medal; that both are articles of
superstition, not of faith.”123 Because “everything seems to have lost specific value, and
has become unrecognizable for human comprehension, unusable for human purpose,”
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Arendt concludes we cannot escape the burden of the twentieth century. Progress?
Doom? What is this medal Arendt refers to? Why does her analysis of the origins of
anti-Semitism – one that is deeply engaged with the historical significance of the
Dreyfus Affair – start in this way? One of the leading political thinkers of the twentieth
century, Arendt’s thought is not easily classifiable.124 Although at heart she was a
liberal thinker concerned with the rule of law and the protection of individual rights, she
was also skeptical of individualistic tendencies in the practice of politics: “Her
conception of politics is based instead on the idea of active citizenship, that is, on the
value and importance of civic engagement and collective deliberation about all matters
affecting the political community.”125 As she looked back on the failures of European
liberalism Arendt did not see an accident of sorts, but rather the worst expression of the
system’s failures.

Arendt was troubled by the problem of modernity. By modernity I understand
“an intellectual tendency or social perspective characterized by departure from or
repudiation of traditional ideas, doctrines, and cultural values in favour of contemporary
or radical values and beliefs (chiefly those of scientific rationalism and liberalism).”126
If this definition can be applied to numerous ideological and intellectual movements, it
is nonetheless important to strike a division between modernity as an understanding of
the world and modernity as a historical period that has increasingly become more
difficult to define. The importance of the term rests on its ideological connotations, on
the fact that it can be used and has been used to advance ideas and policies of a
particular nature throughout the past two or three centuries. It would be unwise to select
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an exact moment in history when modernity began, but 1789 has consistently been
identified as the year in which its political dimension materialized. The French
Revolution was, like all events in history, the product of certain conditions and
developments. Even though the long period preceding the Revolution had prepared the
ground for the intellectual developments of the Enlightenment and the social mutations
of the 18th century, in the words of Alexis de Tocqueville, “In 1789 the French engaged
in the greatest effort that any people have ever embarked on, in order to cut in two, so to
say, their destiny, and to separate by an abyss what they had been up to that point from
what they presently wished to be.”127
Modernity is the age of the modern man, and the modern man is the product of
the French Revolution. He is a rational being equal to all others, void of all social,
racial, ethnic, religious, or geographical differences. He is an abstraction in two
fundamental ways. First he is a being whose life depends on the eradication of all
categories, so that his picture does not depend on an external sense of rootedness but on
an internal definition. Because all men are born equal man is an abstraction. Second, he
is always changing and for this reason he is always modern. To be modern is to live in
the present, where all past categories can and should be effaced. Modern man is abstract
because he lives beyond himself; he asks how he can be internally unique and he rejects
what makes him externally ordinary. He is first and foremost an individual, and only
then perhaps the member of a family, community, social class, nation, religion, or
church.
The premodern world stands in opposition to the idea of the individual as a
universal category that surpasses all other categories. In the world preceding the French
Revolution human beings were members of a kingdom united under God and King; they
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belonged to a social class which in its restrictive nature acted almost as a caste; they
lived where their ancestors had settled and they worked the land that their children
would live on; they obeyed the order of things and prayed for a good afterlife. What
they didn’t do was ask who they were and what they could become. The possibilities in
the premodern world were as limited as they are endless in the modern world. To speak
of the separation between these two worlds must not entail the clear division between
two historical eras. On the contrary, as the seeds of modernity begin to grow
premodernity appears invincible. As the modern emerges out of the earth, the
premodern fights to keep it under. If anything, the modern age is characterized by the
conflict between these two states. For example, the Congress of Vienna sought to set
back the clock of history. In the aftermath of the French Revolution ghettos were once
more created, Napoleonic legislation repealed, and privileges reinstated. Vienna was a
reaction to modernity, but modernity eventually began to win its battles. In this ongoing
process individuals are born and social barriers begin to crumble. But the victory of
modernity, the belief that a human being can imagine and project himself onto the
world, brings along a general malaise. Communities are shattered, the family loses its
predominance, fortunes are made and lost, and manners slowly wear away. Reactions to
these changes result in a reconfiguration of modernity. Since the premodern world can
never be recovered the enemies of modernity find new ways to realize their political
ambitions. They use modern methods or adopt modern ideologies but they ultimately
only dream of halting the advance of progress. Their attack is centered on the individual
– as both an abstract category, and as an actual social and political foe – because he is
responsible for the erosion of older structures such as the family and the community.
In Arendt’s work these questions are crystallized against the background of antiSemitism during the 19th century, Imperialism between the end of the 19th and the

56

beginning of the 20th, and Totalitarianism with the advent of Nazism and Stalinism.128
For Arendt “modernity is the age where the past no longer carries any certainty of
evaluation, where individuals, having lost their traditional standards and values, must
search for new grounds of human community as such.”129 This is the problem of
modernity. Arendt argues that this conflict can only be understood by studying the
degeneration of the Nation State, the ultimate guarantor of the modern world. If the
concept of the individual is an intellectual expression of modernity, then the citizen is
the political result of this notion. The two are different but they are both based on
abstract universalistic notions of being. Even though the process of modern European
Nation State building preceded the French Revolution, it nonetheless benefited from the
changes that 1789 brought along. In a new world of no privileges or communities, in
which centralization and universal laws rule over citizens, the most important
cornerstone of the modern State has been set up. The State is a power structure that
governs over a population and a territory. Internally it needs the recognition of its
citizens and externally the recognition of other states. It must be legitimate, both in the
respect it creates for itself and in its use of force. The modern State requires the
individual modern citizen, since without him it is subject to older power structures such
as the family, the Church or the community. But the individual also needs the State, for
in order to truly become a modern being he must first become a citizen. With equal
rights he can exercise his individuality in a manner that would have been impossible
under the old power structures.
When one looks at the French Revolution these abstract concepts gain shape.
The abolition of privileges included in the principles of the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen gave the State the power to collect taxes from all its members,
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but it also meant that any citizen could become an officer in the French Army. Careers
open to talent meant careers open to individuals no longer subject to societal constraints
and political restrictions. Men were now allowed to express their interior capabilities
and particularities.

An analysis of the changes brought about by the French Revolution would not be
complete without first addressing Alexis de Tocqueville’s The Old Regime and the
Revolution. Written in 1856, this work combines history with political theory in a way
that makes the transformation of France during the revolutionary tide of the 1790s quite
transparent. The object of the book was to “understand why this great revolution, which
was at the same time being prepared in most of the European continent, erupted here
rather than elsewhere, why it emerged out of the society that it was to destroy, and
finally why the old monarchy should have fallen in such a complete and sudden
manner.”130 Long before Arendt, Tocqueville reflected on the world that had emerged
out of 1789: “Men being no longer attached to one another by any links of castes, of
classes, of corporations, of families, are but too inclined to worry only about their
particular interests, always tending to envision only themselves and to retire in a narrow
individualism where all public virtue is suffocated.”131 He concluded that “our fathers
did not have the word individualism that we have forged for our usage, because in their
time there were in effect no individuals.”132 Arendt completed her work with a
discussion of loneliness and individual isolation – the preconditions and results of
totalitarianism she argued. Almost a century before Tocqueville had pointed out the
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dangers of cultivating a glacial private life that surpasses our sense of civic
participation.133
Like The Origins of Totalitarianism, The Old Regime and the Revolution is
framed by political theory but fundamentally concerned with historical inquiry.
Tocqueville provides an analysis of the pre-1789 world and compares it to the world
created by the Revolution. He argues against many false notions and historical
misunderstandings, but his central case is that the French Revolution was not a break
with the past but rather a strengthening of certain tendencies particular to France – key
among these the empowerment of the State – and an abandonment of practices that had
become impediments in the practice of government (feudalist structures, corporations
and privileges). In fact, “The idea of forming only one class of citizens would have
appealed to Richelieu.”134 This can help explain why the French Revolution knew no
frontiers: it advocated an ideology that was universalistic in practice. If throughout the
Enlightenment changes had been made toward the centralization, simplification and
rationalization of the monarchical and autocratic European kingdoms, in a few months
the Revolution accelerated the tide of reform and finally put an end to the practices of
the past. Tocqueville argues that under the Old Regime the “unity of the nation [was]
already transparent; legislation uniform,”135 but the old provinces of France, some of
which were older than the monarchy itself, were only abolished by the Revolution and
instead a system of eighty three departments was established.136
In the first chapter of book three Tocqueville addresses the political influence
the Enlightenment’s philosophes exercised after the mid eighteenth century. Occupied
with questions of governance, they “all think that it is necessary to substitute simple and
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elementary rules, founded on reason and natural law, for the complicated and traditional
customs that rule the society of their time.”137 Witnesses to the inequities of their
century, aware of the excesses of feudalism, shocked by the backwardness of their
surroundings, the majority of them imagine a better world constructed around coherent
systems of thought: “They took disgust in ancient things and tradition, and they were
naturally led to wanting to rebuild the society of their time after an entirely new plan,
that each of them traced to the unique light of his reason.”138 In this fight for a new
world the Catholic Church stood as a remnant of an obscurantist past based on instinct
rather than reason, on persecution as opposed to inclusion. “It stood principally upon
tradition,”139 and to those who despised the past it was also an expression of an
authority superior to individual reason, founded on hierarchies and mysticism.
Tocqueville argues that under the Old Regime the Church was the most important
political power and that the Revolution transferred many of its prerogatives to the State.
Those who carried out the Revolution were believers, but not in the authority and
sanctity of the Church: “They believed in themselves. They did not doubt the
perfectibility, the might of man; they were also passionate about his glory, they had
faith in his virtue.”140 Tocqueville admires their engagement and their valor but he
wonders whether this new religion was not also a new form of blindness and error.
The attack on institutionalized religion was unique, not so much in character as
in how it was paired with the abolition of the old political order. In most other political
revolutions up to that point, Tocqueville argues, those who had attacked the established
order had left religious institutions untouched, and those who had reformed religion had
not interfered in the system of government. The French Revolution was unique because
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it simultaneously attacked the Church and the old State structures. In this sense “the
human spirit entirely lost its hold; it no longer knew what to expect or where to stop,
and what was witnessed was the appearance of revolutionaries of an unknown species,
who took audacity all the way to folly.”141
But what new order did the Revolution create? Was the State truly transformed,
and if yes, how so? Tocqueville’s vision of the post-revolutionary world highlights the
central conflict between premodernity and modernity. His conception of the individual
is understood in the context of the emergence of the modern State. To create new men
the Revolution had to create a new state of things, and to do so it had to destroy the old
order for a new human being to emerge. And yet, the modern State did not merely grow
out of the void created by the Revolution. Tocqueville’s central question is why the
Revolution came about. How did it change France? But more importantly, who
benefited from its consequences? Rather than point to a social class or group,
Tocqueville argues that the Revolution was fought against all empowered classes and
institutions as a way of asserting the absolute authority of the modern State. The
administration and the centralized organization of Louis XIV’s reign had made this
process possible, and now the Revolution necessarily appeared as the next political
goal. If the absolute monarchy was carried away in its own attempt to strengthen its grip
on power it is only because it chose its allies poorly, angered its traditional supporters
and misunderstood the tide of 1789. Before the individual emerged as both an
intellectual concept and a social model, before the National Assembly declared the
citizen as a universal abstraction and a person entitled with rights and responsibilities,
the State was already in place. When Tocqueville’s central argument is taken to its
ultimate consequences it becomes evident that the State put in place by the French
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Revolution was not pulled out of midair but rather perfected from the older model. The
State was there before the people, when there were only monarchs and subjects, not
peoples.
The new State knows no boundaries: “In reality, there are no limits to its rights
or checks as to what it can do; it does not only reform men, it transforms them.”142 With
the authority of the Church finally stalled, its power “does not directly descend from
God; it is not attached to tradition; it is impersonal: it is no longer called king, but State;
it is not the heritage of a family; it is the product and the representative of all, and must
check the right of each under the will of all.”143 Made up of indistinct citizens the State
becomes the expression of all and none, its interests not the agglomeration of all
interests but the expression of a so-called raison d’État. To Tocqueville “this particular
form of tyranny that is called democratic despotism,” entails no more “hierarchies in
society; no more marked classes, no more fixed ranks; a people composed of
individuals almost alike and entirely equal.”144 And above them, a leader.

It is not for us to judge whether such a notion of the State can be translated from
political theory into practice. The history of modern Europe may well prove the
opposite. The notions of individuality and statehood on which the Revolution operated
excluded enormous segments of the population, key among these women. Most
revolutionaries envisioned a new man, not a new woman. But what matters for our
purposes is that such conceptions came to be linked with the events of 1789; that the
State emerged as an apparatus based on new ideals that refuted old forms of authority;
that particular groups such as the Jews were granted citizenship based on these ideals;
that the reactions to the abstractions of the period sought to link the liberation of these
142
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groups to the fate of revolutionary ideals; and that these ideals came under increased
attack in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. For Arendt “the great challenge
to the modern period, and its peculiar danger, has been that in it man for the first time
has confronted man without the protection of differing circumstances and conditions.
And it has been precisely this new concept of equality that has made modern race
relations so difficult, for there we deal with natural differences which by no possible
and conceivable change of conditions can become less conspicuous. It is because
equality demands that I recognize each and every individual as my equal, that the
conflicts between different groups, which for reasons of their own are reluctant to grant
each other this basic equality, take on such terribly cruel forms.”145 Arendt touches on
perhaps the most crucial contradiction encountered by the revolutionaries of 1789: in its
attempt to create a new society made up of equal citizens, the State ignored the different
groups that made up French society.
With the emancipation of the Jews, the Revolution, “by its universalistic
proclamations and the cult of Reason that illustrated it for some time,”146 could bring
back the “‘Jewish question’ – that of a particularism contrary to assimilation and, in
addition, of a religious particularism contrary to the new national religion.”147 In the
debates on the eligibility of Jews for citizenship that followed the proclamation of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen the Count of Clermont-Tonnerre made
the position of the new order in regards to the Jews quite explicit: “The Jews should be
denied everything as a nation, but granted everything as individuals. They must be
citizens….there cannot be one nation within another nation.”148 The Sephardim were
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recognized as citizens on January 28, 1790, followed by the official Emancipation
Decree on September 28, 1791. The communal autonomy that the Jews had enjoyed
since the Middle Ages was abolished on the grounds that it was incompatible with the
modern State.149 The Jews were thus granted political equality, but this did not result in
social equality: “Deeper, older, and more fateful contradictions are hidden behind the
abstract and palpable inconsistency that Jews received citizenship from governments
which in the process of centuries had made nationality a prerequisite for citizenship and
homogeneity of population the outstanding characteristics of the body politic.”150 Jews
were forced to abandon the ghettos in exchange for equal status, but this equality was
not based on the practical realities of the Nation State. The Revolution declared that all
men were equal but in reality the Jews remained the object of deeply rooted antiSemitism. Their gradual entrance into French society was not accepted as the natural
realization of the Enlightenment, but as a direct violation of French unity. If the ghettos
now stood open and the walls of French nationhood were gone, nationalists believed
that the French family would be weakened.
In this sense “the Dreyfus Affair brings into the open all other elements of
nineteenth-century antisemitism in its mere ideological and political aspects; it is the
culmination of the antisemitism which grew out of the special conditions of the nationstate.”151 For Arendt the failure of integration was the result of circumstances particular
to nineteenth-century Europe and alien to any abstract notions of nation and citizen. In
the first place the representatives of the Enlightenment disliked and distrusted the
Jews.152 They were viewed as elements of reaction, remnants of an aristocratic order,
supporters of mysticism and backwardness. This hostility on the part of what later
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became the French left was in some ways still present at the time of the Dreyfus Affair.
Part of the Jews’ inability to integrate into French society may have been due to the
long animosity held by those who were supposed to be their closest allies. To read Zola
is to forget that at first Dreyfus did not receive the support of the French left, and that if
this later changed it was primarily the result of the realization that much more than
opinions were at stake in the debates between Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. As the
Affair became a national crisis, as it moved from the legal to the public realm, as it
gained in political intensity, the ideological stakes were finally crystallized.
The attack on the Jew that gained popularity before and during the Dreyfus
Affair was a new form of political reaction, a “calculated assault upon every single
individual of Jewish origin.”153 More importantly, a “passion-driven hunt of the ‘Jew in
general,’ the ‘Jew everywhere and nowhere,’ cannot be understood if one considers the
history of antisemitism as an entity in itself, as a mere political movement.”154 To
Arendt, modern anti-Semitism emerged in part out of the old religious anti-Semitism,
and in part as a reaction to the nation building tactics of the modern State. Political
equality was in many ways responsible for the nonpolitical nature of Jews during the
nineteenth century, but it also resulted in a rise in social inequality. In theory the Jew
who became a citizen ceased to be a Jew. In practice quite the opposite took place: the
Jew became a political symbol and an object of Counter-Enlightenment political
attacks. As an emancipated figure who had dared to reinvent himself, he was deemed a
dangerous cosmopolite, a being foreign to the concept of the nation, detached from the
roots of the country, unknown to French nature.
This abstract notion of the Jew was repeatedly used to describe specific subjects.
For most anti-Semites the Rothschild family’s fortune seemed to represent the prompt
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empowerment of Jewish finance in the post-revolutionary era. The family’s German
origins as well as its impressive successes in banking were perfect points of attack. The
Rothschilds had left the ghetto, moved to France, built up a bank, and created a system
of wealth detached from land ownership. They were constantly blamed for France’s
economic hardships and their name became attached to a strong power myth. In
November 1891, for instance, thirty deputies asked for the expulsion of the Rothschild
family from France.155 As political symbols the Rothschilds were but an example of
how notions of nationhood affected particular conceptions of Jews in nineteenth-century
France.

The emergence of the modern State during the post-1789 period cannot be
separated from the development of nationalism, both as a new intellectual conception
and as a powerful political ideology. In order to understand the importance played by
nationalism during the Dreyfus Affair it is first necessary to confront its origins.
Immersed in the Enlightenment as both a reaction to its universalism and as a product of
its re-conceptualization of the individual, nationalism is central to an understanding of
the conflict between modernity and premodernity on the one hand, and the creation of
the modern State with its universal category of the citizen on the other. The Nation State
described and analyzed by Hannah Arendt is but the ultimate manifestation of all these
intellectual abstractions. But nationalism is also a concrete political movement, and as a
study of Johann Gottfried Herder’s ideas shows, it is central to a particular conception
of the world, of history and of the role of the individual in the modern world.
For Isaiah Berlin, Herder was a pivotal figure of European CounterEnlightenment, a broad movement characterized by a “rejection of the central principles
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of the Enlightenment – universality, objectivity, rationality, and the capacity to provide
permanent solutions to all genuine problems of life or thought.”156 Born in 1744,
Herder’s ideas became central to the development of German Romanticism. He was
hostile to all-encompassing systems of thought, and as a result his philosophy is
profoundly unsystematic. Common themes run through his oeuvre, key among them his
objection to universalism and his interest in the particular, the diverse, the unique, the
irreducible. Berlin argues that although his ideas were embedded in the context of the
Enlightenment they were also a reaction to its cosmopolitanism: “He believed in
kinship, social solidarity, Volkstum, nationhood, but to the end of his life he detested
and denounced every form of centralization, coercion, and conquest, which were
embodied and symbolized…in the accursed state. Nature creates nations, not states.”157
The State dehumanizes, conquers and controls. It crushes the particularities of an area
and ignores the culture of a people. Men are not made to be citizens, they are instead
endowed by nature with certain characteristics intrinsic to their time and place: “They
should live in natural units, that is, in societies united by a common culture.”158 The
State robs us of ourselves for it imposes an alien concept of the world on human life; it
destroys the organic order of society; and it corrupts the internal nature of a people.
Herder’s understanding of the individual is diametrically opposed to the notions
on which the modern world is constructed. Man is great for what he is, not for what he
may be. No man is alone, for he “builds on what has come before, which turns into and
wants to be nothing but the foundation of the future – thus speaks the analogy in nature,
the talking image of God in all works!”159 Our humanity is not expressed in the free
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development of each individual member of a state but in the plurality of national and
regional cultures. For Berlin, Herder’s defense of pluralism against universalism is
“perhaps the most revolutionary” of his views: “Men, according to Herder, truly
flourish only in congenial circumstances, that is, where the group to which they belong
has achieved a fruitful relationship with the environment by which it is shaped and
which in turn it shapes.”160 Only when the individual is integrated into the community
of men can he exist as a man and live happily. Confronted with the most fundamental
philosophical questions – “What is the best life for men? And more particularly, What is
the most perfect society?”161 – man can only find the answers in the organic setting of
his time. Solutions are thus contingent on temporality and geography.
Berlin argues that to Herder “the notion of the perfect civilization in which the
ideal human being realizes his full potentialities is patently absurd: not merely difficult
to formulate, or impossible to realize in practice, but incoherent and unintelligible. This
is perhaps the sharpest blow ever delivered to the West, to which the notion of
perfection – the possibility, at least in principle, of universal, timeless solutions or
problems of value – is essential.”162 His rejection of the modern State is in this sense all
the more coherent. The belief that men can be turned into individual citizens with the
capability to fully determine their destinies and happiness under one benevolent State is
absurd because it considers humanity as an abstract and unchanging perfectible body.
The citizen is always the same since he depends on the internal will of the individual
and the absolute power of the impartial State. Even if the State evolves or the individual
is another, the objective remains fixed: to improve the human condition. But what if the
citizen as a political construction is misleading? If men are not equal in their aspirations
and realities how can they be politically equal? How can happiness always be the same,
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always mean the same? And the State: is it not in fact a mechanical construction, an
abstract notion that disparages human happiness? By forcing the human spirit to emerge
does it not in fact crush it? What good are individuals, what is the object of the citizen
when there are no men?
Herder was aware of these questions even before the French Revolution broke
out. In Another Philosophy of History, a work published in 1774, he argued for the
uniqueness of each historical epoch and culture. History was not a logical progression
into a better future; modern man not a more developed kind of human being. Herder
writes “that no people ever remained or could have remained what it was for long, and
that each one, like any art and science and what not in the world, had its period of
growth, of blossoming, and of decline…that finally in the world, no two moments are
ever the same,”163 and that to think of the world in universal terms is to reject more
profound forms of connectedness: “The ideas of a universal love of mankind, peoples,
and enemies elevated and the warm feeling of affection for one’s father, mother,
brother, children, and friends infinitely diminished!”164 Like Tocqueville after him he
pointed to the dangers of the modern world: “Freedom, sociability, and equality, such as
they are germinating everywhere now, have brought about many evils through their
thousand-fold abuse, and they will continue to do so.”165 In sharp opposition to the
modern conception of the individual, Herder’s view is that human beings are infinitely
small in the larger history of humanity, that one man’s aspirations and dreams are less
important than his belonging to a small part of the human condition. “What am I
supposed to say about the great book of God that extends over all the worlds and times,
when I am barely a single letter in that book and when, looking around, I can scarcely
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see three more letters?”166 he asks at the end of the essay. A human life is a letter, a
fragment as it is. How can a letter attempt to write words, chapters, titles? A letter is by
itself meaningless, but combined with other letters it can form words and sentences.
The words and sentences give meaning to individual letters in the same way that
families, communities and nations give human beings a sense of rootedness. Berlin
writes that for Herder “art, morality, custom, religion, national life grow out of
immemorial tradition, are created by entire societies living an integrated communal
life.”167 More importantly though “men, if they are to exercise their faculties fully, and
so develop into all that they can be, need to belong to identifiable communal groups,
each with its own outlook, style, traditions, historical memories and language.”168 It was
Herder who set in motion the idea that nations are a product of nature, that they are the
manifestation of centuries of shared experiences and memories, the ultimate realization
of a shared language. As an organic being man belongs to these organic forms, but more
importantly he belongs to a nation. The nation is understood as a premodern body that
precedes the modern State, the rise of individualism, the creation of the citizen, and the
universalism of the Enlightenment. Cosmopolitanism is dangerous because “as a world
citizen, and no longer a citizen of Athens, you must naturally lack a view on what you
ought to do in Athens, a secure sense of what you are doing, and a feeling of joy about
what you have accomplished.”169 The Enlightenment meant that “before, wisdom was
always narrowly national and therefore reached deeper and attracted more strongly; but
how widely it casts its rays now!”170 To Herder nations are the proper agents of human
expression.
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Herder has been repeatedly classified as the father of German nationalism. His
ideas were adopted by generations of political thinkers and philosophers, not least the
intellectual precursors of Nazism. And yet, this history is largely the product of
misappropriations and misunderstandings. The nation Herder envisions is one rooted in
community and culture, not race and war. His propositions are those of an eighteenthcentury early romantic and not, as is sometimes argued, a late nineteenth-century
nationalist theorist. In fact “his nationalism was never political, and his personal politics
simply had no room for aggression, violence, and disrespect.”171 Berlin makes the case
that “Herder was no nationalist: he supposed that different cultures could and should
flourish fruitfully side by side like so many peaceful flowers in the great human
garden.”172 But in dealing with Herder’s thought we cannot restrict ourselves to the
immediate consequences of his ideas. Needless to say, Herder was not a nationalist in
the sense that is now attached to the word. Neither was he a racist or an anti-Semite. But
if his conception of humanity is carried to its ultimate implications, if the journey
traveled by his ideas is followed, if his concepts of Volk and nation are understood as
corner stones of later political developments, then his philosophy becomes historically
informative when tracing the ideologies of certain major anti-Dreyfusard figures such as
Maurice Barrès. In the first section of Another Philosophy of History Herder writes:
“Prejudice is good in its time: it makes men happy. It pushes peoples together at their
center, making them stand firmer upon their roots, more flourishing in their way, more
virile, and also happier in their inclinations and purposes. The most ignorant, prejudiced
nation is in this sense often the first: the age of dreamy wanderings and hopeful
journeys abroad is already sickness, flatulence, bloatedness, premonition of death!” 173
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This passage could well have been written by Barrès in the decade preceding the
Dreyfus Affair. Herder understands prejudice as a form of self-identification which is
based on the recognition of the foreigner, of the ‘other’. A nation understands itself in
opposition to other nations around it. Herder wrote this essay in an age when French
was spoken by the elites of Germany, and when all that came from France was deemed
better than what originated in Germany. His concern was thus to promote German
cultural activity. But the passage must have been understood very differently in the late
nineteenth century. To trace the influence of Herder is to discover a different
understanding of the nation, but one that is fundamentally concerned with the same
preoccupations. As Berlin argues, “The seeds of nationalism are unmistakably present
in his fervid attacks on hollow cosmopolitanism and universalism (with which he
charged the French philosophes); they grew apace among his aggressive nineteenthcentury disciples.”174 Like Herder, the anti-Semitic thinkers of the late nineteenth
century were deeply disturbed by modernity, by the loss of bearings and norms, of
customs and traditions. They feared the erosion of national feelings and habits, the
abandonment of the countryside and the local community, and the blurriness of
capitalist society. If Herder had advocated a focus on language and culture to safeguard
human dignity, men like Barrès and Drumont were now determined to stop the tide of
modernity in order to create a different human race. In their efforts to solve the problem
of modernity they turned to the dilemma that had preoccupied them for a century: the
Jewish question.

As we have seen, anti-Semitism sharply increased in the 1880s. When Dreyfus
joined the Army, France was being devoured by an intense campaign aimed at purging
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society of all Jewish elements. Before addressing the ideas of anti-Semites such as
Barrès and Drumont we must turn our attention to Jean-Paul Sartre’s Reflections on the
Jewish Question. Written in the autumn of 1944, Sartre’s essay addresses that question
which engaged the energies and hostility of Dreyfus’ generation: the intellectual
meaning of anti-Semitism. Sartre argues that “anti-Semitism is a free and total
individual choice, a global attitude that one adopts not only in respect to the Jews, but of
men in general, of history and society; it is at once a passion and a conception of the
world.”175 Different anti-Semites are anti-Semitic in different ways, but they all share a
common vision of the world, an understanding of what human beings are and of what
the political community should look like. Sartre spells out this vision in the first of three
chapters. He argues that the Jew is a symbol of all that the anti-Semite rejects, that “if
the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him,”176 and that this vision is more
important than what the Jew may actually be or wish to be. In other words, a Jew’s
Jewishness is not determined by him, it is contingent on a negative categorization. This
is why the Jew can never fully assimilate into society, why he cannot be French or
German, why he cannot stand for what he wants, why – finally – he can never be rooted
in the nation.
Sartre looks at particular instances in which the Jew is conceptualized and
excluded. In regards to capitalism and competition “the true Frenchman rooted in his
province, in his country, carried by a twenty century long tradition, benefiting of an
ancestral wisdom, guided by customs, does not need intelligence. What shapes his
virtue is the assimilation of qualities instated by the labor of a hundred generations on
the objects that surround him – property. But it follows that it is the inherited property,
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not the one acquired.”177 Because the Jew is not rooted he is therefore a universal being.
This means his relationship to language is different than a Frenchman’s: “Perhaps the
Jew speaks a purer French than I do, perhaps he knows more about syntax, grammar,
perhaps he is even a writer: it doesn’t matter. This language, he has spoken it for only
twenty years and I have for a thousand years.”178 Sartre understands the historical
origins of anti-Semitism. His argument goes to great length to show how the opinion
that an anti-Semite forms of the Jews is not conditioned by his interaction with them but
by his rejection of certain ideas.
More importantly, the anti-Semite does not form his opinions individually. His
expression of them is always in a group, always in defense of others, always as a joint
rebellion against an abstract notion of the individual.179 This is why anti-Semitism joins
people, why it can be used to mobilize society, and why in the case of the Dreyfus
Affair it resulted in the mingling of social classes: “Proust showed, for example, how
anti-Dreyfusisme brought the Duke closer to his coachman, how due to their hatred of
Dreyfus, bourgeois families forcefully opened the doors of the aristocracy.”180 Before
Arendt, Sartre pointed out the great tragedy of integration and assimilation. Even
though Jews gained individual rights, they were unable to join the social community
and they remained distinct within the political realm. The Jew “is the slave of no one: a
free citizen in a regime that authorizes free competition, no social dignity, no State
appointment is forbidden to him; he will be decorated with the Legion of Honor, great
lawyer, minister.”181 But Sartre tries to go beyond the social dimensions of the Jewish
question. Since “the rationalism of the Jews is a passion: the passion of the
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Universal,”182 the irrationalism of the anti-Semites is the passion of the particular, in
which “the true France, with its true values, its true tact, its true morality,”183 remains
alien to the Jew. For Sartre, the advocate of a universal philosophy, the fate of Jews is
linked to the fate of humanity. The emancipation of the Jew derives from the belief in
the individual worth of the human being, not in the attachment to old inhumane forms
of understanding: “Anti-Semitism, in one word, is fear in the face of the human
condition. The anti-Semite is the man who wants to be a pitiless rock, a furious torrent,
a devastating thunderbolt: everything but a man.”184

Sartre’s analysis is particularly relevant when one looks at the ideas of antiSemitic anti-Dreyfusards. Stephen Wilson argues that “as French antisemites were well
aware, they were participating in a phenomenon, which had European dimensions, but
French antisemitism has also its own particular history.”185 This history may lie outside
our research but it is important to acknowledge that the rise of anti-Semitism in the
decade before the Affair was by no means without precedents. Religious anti-Semitism,
with its long history throughout Europe, accused Jews of having crucified Christ. More
recent tragedies and catastrophes fit into this model, including the French Revolution,
the war of 1870, the occupation of Rome by the Italian Kingdom, the Paris Commune,
and the rise of the Third Republic.186 Religious anti-Semitism found new strength in the
century following the French Revolution,187 not least because of the belief that Jews had
instigated and carried out the fall of the monarchy as a way of acquiring new rights and
privileges. Whereas in other European nations anti-Semitism retained its traditional
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religious component, in France it merged with contemporary political discontent and
“thus preserved elements from popular traditional culture, but recast them into forms
that suited the modern context of literate and national democratic culture.”188 France
bequeathed Europe the first anti-Semitic racial theorist in the figure of Count Joseph
Arthur de Gobineau, whose Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (1853-1855)
was poorly known in France up to the end of the nineteenth century but gained great
acceptance in Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century.189
More important than the revival of Gobineau was Herder’s influence on French
intellectuals. Zeev Sternhell argues that Herder’s ideas played a decisive role in the
shaping of Michelet, Renan, and Taine, all three major French intellectual figures of the
time. From Herder they took two main concerns: a historicist approach to human nature
and a belief in the primacy of the nation. In historicism they adopted an underlying
belief in the particularization of human events, that is to say a rejection of fundamental
unchanging principles and an embrace of local conditions and peculiarities. History
could not be understood as a logical progression of events ruled by general principles,
but as the product of differing circumstances subject to time and place. Historicism was
thus a rejection of the permanence of human nature, an attack on reason, and a “revolt
against the idea of man.”190 This conception of the world is all the more informative
when placed alongside Sartre’s analysis of anti-Semitism. In order to claim that the antiSemite wants to be anything but a man, Sartre must have a notion of what it means to be
a man. But what if his universalization of the problem is contrary to human realities, to
particularities, to the changing nature of man from one place to another, from one
century to the next? In the historicist conception of man that French intellectuals such as
Michelet took from Herder one finds a premodern understanding of the world, one at
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odds with Sartre’s modern vision. Michel Winock argues that Counter-Enlightenment
figures who espoused Herder’s ideas “don’t believe in Man…they believe in particular
human groups – in national and religious singularities.”191
Thus the nation became the last rampart against the cosmopolitanism and
universalism of modernity: “Herder gave Europe the idea of the irreducible
individuality of the nation that finds within itself its own way of life, above all universal
law.”192 In the French context the nation was the result of a long history of political
integration, centralization, and cultural homogenization based on the institutionalization
of the French language. As we have seen with Tocqueville, this process accelerated
during the course of the eighteenth century and was strengthened by the French
Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire. Whereas in most of Europe nationalism
emerged as a movement of unification, in France it was propelled by fears of political
disintegration, cultural decadence and economic decline. Albert S. Lindemann argues
that France’s economic weakness was for many a source of anguish: “From its position
as the second industrialist power in Europe early in the century, France dropped to
fourth place, passed by both Germany and Russia by the eve of World War I. The
deceleration of France’s economy in the 1880s, from a 1.6 percent growth rate in the
previous decade to 0.6 percent, alarmed many French patriots.”193 French population
growth also slowed down during the second half of the nineteenth century. More
importantly, perhaps, were the effects of the long period of political turmoil that had
struck France since 1789, resulting in a loss of confidence in the State’s ability to
maintain stability and order. All these factors helped give French nationalism its
makeup. More than a political movement, nationalism, as it was experienced in France
during the Third Republic, was an ideological conception of the French nation and the
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world. France was understood as the result of a long tradition that included the glories
of the past – Joan of Arc, Saint Louis, Louis XIV – and the realities of the present – a
uniform language and a specific ‘French’ landscape. In this sense French nationalism
was very similar to other nationalisms that emerged during the nineteenth century.
Sternhell writes that “it is the idea of a mission invested in the nation, of peace
and civilization, the dream of the grandeur of the fatherland, rooted in a profound
feeling of cultural superiority, the idea of a people elected by providence to conduct
humankind, thus the idea of an essential identity between the national interest and the
good of humanity that help explain Michelet’s enthusiasm for Herder,”194 and to a
certain extent Barrès’ interest in Michelet. The crisis of the Third Republic was first a
social, economic and demographic crisis, but it quickly became an identity crisis as
well. By the time the Dreyfus Affair broke out, a number of currents and preoccupations
had merged into a new understanding of France. In opposition to the Enlightenment’s
rationalism and universalism, to the advent of the modern citizen and the modern State,
to the notion of individuals united by equality and liberty, a new intellectual disposition
began to take shape. Influenced by the ideas of Herder, shaped by the political realities
of France, immersed in a conflict with the modern world, suspicious of the latent
changes in French society, it sought to reinvent what it meant to be French, to live in the
French nation, to embody French ideals. In the war against 1789 a number of
intellectuals abandoned universalism as a way of recovering the French spirit: “The
nation, finally, was no longer that ensemble of citizens from the first years of the French
Revolution, but a body, a great family gathered around its churches and cemeteries,
communing in the cult of its ancestors, ruled by a new moral.”195 It was only during the
Affair that these ideas fell into place, that the divisions between modernity and
194
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premodernity were fully expressed, that, finally, France entered its deepest identity
struggle since the Revolution. Only when placed in a larger philosophical and historical
context does the Dreyfus Affair present us with an understanding of its significance. If
Dreyfus had a greater effect on France than the Panama scandal or Boulangism it was
because his case presented the entire nation with the same critical questions that had
surfaced in 1789.
With the Dreyfus Affair, historicism and nationalism merged into an actual
political position. As far as Zola and Clemenceau shaped the Dreyfusard discourse into
a coherent defense of the individual, anti-Dreyfusards such as Barrès and Drumont
claimed a position as protectors of the French nation. Their anti-Semitism fused with
their nationalism, the two inseparable since “antisemites were, first of all, against the
Jews, but, secondly, they were against the Jews, because they were for France and the
French.”196 Even though the anti-Dreyfusard camp gathered supporters of different
political inclinations it must be stressed that its radical wing – made up of nationalists
and anti-Semites – was “able to maintain a relatively common front, and, more
importantly, presented a relatively homogenous ideology.”197 In general terms the
ideology of anti-Semitic anti-Dreyfusards rejected the modern world and contrasted it
with a vision of an “Old France,” in which “modern change and mobility were
measured against a static view of past society; modern disorder, diversity and relativism
were set against order, hierarchy and absolute values.”198 And yet, neither Drumont nor
Barrès preached a return to this “Old France”: “Not only was Barrès prepared to accept
the present; he was also ready to admit the faults of the past.”199 In the same way that
their anti-Semitism was not of the older religious form, the solutions they offered and
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the methods they employed can only be understood as reactions to modernity, that is,
more as modern manifestations of a premodern ideology than as reactionary views.
Theirs was a different proposition to Maurras’, who “was the classic 19th
century, as distinct from the modern, counter-revolutionary. His desire was to return to
what he thought was the peak of French civilization, the 17th century, and his view was
that life ought not to have moved on from that period.”200 If the Counter-Enlightenment
views of Barrès and Drumont were similarly opposed to the reactionary nature of
Maurras’, they were distinct in their philosophical conception of the world. The thought
of Barrès is more subtle and congruous than Drumont’s. The former was an influential
intellectual figure; a novelist, thinker and political theorist. The latter was “undoubtedly
a third rank writer, but a demagogue of the first order!”201 Barrès “does not peddle the
kind of crude biological racialism and anti-Semitism that Drumont turned into an
industry.”202 Even though both figures developed different forms of anti-Semitism, their
ideas can be understood as parts of a general malaise with the modern world, and as an
ultimate reaction to the progress of the Enlightenment.

Like Émile Zola for the Dreyfusards, Maurice Barrès was a pivotal figure for the
anti-Dreyfusards. For Sternhell he situated himself as the first anti-Dreyfusard
intellectual.203 Born in 1862, he arrived in Paris in 1883 to make a living as a writer and
politician. Elected as a Boulangist deputy for Nancy in 1889, he quickly formulated a
distinct political discourse adjusted to anti-bourgeois anxieties and nationalist
sentiments: “Barrès is, with Drumont, one of the first writers and publicists to
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understand the mobilizing force of anti-Semitism.”204 With his ideology, anti-Semitism
becomes a political action “capable of rallying all social classes and of expressing in a
clear and cutting manner the refusal of the Enlightenment, of emancipation, and of
ideological modernity.”205 But Barrès is a more complicated figure than we would like
him to be. As Sternhell has shown in Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français, there
were in fact important connections between the French right and socialism in the years
preceding the Affair.206 Through his disillusionment with modernity Barrès “considers
the social problem as the capital problem of the modern world, a problem which by its
very amplitude cannot remain constrained within national limits.”207 In this sense,
socialism is a legitimate universal movement; a pragmatic response to exploitation and
iniquity. Barrès admired Jaurès and the Socialists for taking up the cause of the common
man. Indeed, he “invents, during his second electoral campaign in Nancy, in 1898, the
concept of ‘national socialism,’”208 in reference to an ideology that intertwined local
specificity with global concerns, national anxiety with international action.
His anti-Semitism fit entirely within his disdain for the rising bourgeoisie. When
Barrès attacked the ideals of 1789 he not only turned his back on the Enlightenment, he
also deliberately highlighted the connections between Jewish emancipation and national
degeneration. Jewish finance, the “Jewish Syndicate”, Jewish infiltration in the French
Army, all these issues were signs of the shifting economic forces at play in France.
Barrès’ attack on the bourgeoisie was centered on Jews, and it made the explicit
argument that Jewish empowerment after 1789 was the sole result of destructive
economic changes. Unlike other anti-Semites who equated capitalism with Judaism,
Barrès provided a left-wing understanding of the French Revolution that seemed to
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repeat the ideas of Marx: “Since 89, the nature of oppression has hardly changed: what
has changed is the identity of the oppressors.”209 As a member of Boulangisme in the
late 1880s Barrès rallied popular support against the bourgeoisie and the legacy of the
Revolution. Interestingly, for the centennial of the Revolution in 1889 he celebrated
Jacobinism as a force for change which had sought to overthrow an older form of
oppression: hereditary aristocracy. The problem with the Revolution was that it had
placed another privileged caste in power: the modern bourgeoisie. Like the
revolutionaries of 1789, 1830, 1848, and 1871, who had tried to reform the system, a
new brand of Frenchmen was needed to overthrow the existing economic order and
finally put an end to the travesty presented by the Enlightenment. These clear pockets of
socialism meant that during the 1890s Barrès professed great admiration for Jaurès.210
This is as much an indication of the eclecticism of French socialism in the years
preceding the Dreyfus Affair as it is of the intricacies of analyzing the political thought
of Barrès.
Although Barrès consistently moved to the right in the decades that followed,
eventually embracing Catholicism as a political response, at the turn of the Dreyfus
Affair he was still very much a political combination of left-wing socialism and rightwing anti-Semitism. In fact, “In the Dreyfus Affair, the ideas of Barrès mature.”211
Blum, who early on tried to convince Barrès to join the Dreyfusards, had great
admiration for this confident enemy of the Jews and the Enlightenment. As late as 1928
Blum wrote “his memory, as much as his person, have remained close to me.”212 For
him, the ideas of Barrès, for all their antagonism, could be used by other movements
since they did not correspond to any personal conviction or specific thought system.

209

Ibid., 186.
Ibid., 203.
211
Drouin, L’Affaire Dreyfus de A à Z, 123.
212
Sternhell, Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français, 12.
210

82

Sternhell argues that such a view ignores the complexities of Barrèsian thought, as well
as the serious political consequences his ideas had for later generations of French
politicians and thinkers up to Vichy.213 Although the thought of Barrès gained in
intensity during the decades that followed his arrival in Paris in 1883, it had early on
emerged as a coherent ideological response to modernity. For Michel Winock it is even
possible to think of the Barrès years as a distinctly vital episode in French Intellectual
History.214 But what were Barrès’ ideas? How did they affect anti-Dreyfusard
discourse?
The involvement of Barrès alongside the anti-Dreyfusards should in no way be
shocking. In December 1894 Barrès used Dreyfus as a symbol of corruption at the heart
of the French Republic. Liberal democracy and Judaism had already given birth to the
Panama scandal; now it was high treason inside the Army. “That Dreyfus is capable of
betrayal, I deduce from his race,”215 he wrote in 1894. Although Barrès’ anti-Semitism
was inseparable from his political beliefs, it is important to understand his anti-Semitic
discourse as a product of a long philosophical tradition, concerned with notions of
statehood and citizenship. It is difficult to conclude which came first: his instinctive
anti-Semitism or his philosophical nationalism? In either case, an analysis of his ideas
can only enlighten our grasp of his political involvement in the Dreyfus Affair.
Barrès started off with a specific notion of the individual. In his three volumes
from the 1890s entitled The Cult of the Self he elaborated a Nietzschean view of the
individual as a being at odds with modernity. Alienated from a changing world the
individual revolts and refuses to conform to his environment. In this situation the Self is
the only aspect of human existence that can provide a tangible and credible response to
the problems of the individual. In this search the Self determines its enemies: the others,
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the barbarians. Out of this antithetical situation there emerges a realization that the
contemporary world is an “artificial world in which the ladder of values is the fruit of
incertitude and arbitrariness, since the certitudes that were those of the preceding
generations have disappeared with them.”216 Amidst this vast chaos, alongside this
existential uncertainty, the Self must confront the non-Selves that surround it. The Self
must be stronger than the others, and it can only affirm itself through violent
confrontation. In this battle with the non-Selves, with the barbarians as it is, “One must
vanquish or disappear.”217 The Self is thus not separated from the world since its very
existence depends on its engagement with its surroundings. To be free is to confront this
exterior reality and thus affirm the supremacy of the Self above all other Selves.
Sternhell remarks that the connections with Carl Schmitt’s political thought are
indeed striking. The distinction between friend and enemy which Schmitt saw as the
foundation of political activity is a key Barrèsian distinction.218 Barrès became the
intellectual father of French nationalists, Schmitt the legal theorist of the Nazi regime.
The conception of the Self may have remained a pseudo-individualistic notion of strife
and being, but Barrès used it as the cornerstone for a broader, more concrete political
philosophy. The Self cannot exist by itself; in the fight with other Selves it must
distinguish between those it identifies with, and those it rejects because of their
differences. The Self must discover that it is impossible to be isolated from others: “To
be free can be resumed as understanding the factors that condition the individual and to
accept them.”219 The Self exists within an artificial world that must be confronted,
whereupon other Selves are encountered. From this confrontation it discovers similar
Selves conditioned by the same past. The Self is a product of its environment, of the soil
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it inhabits and the Selves that have come before it. The living and the dead coexist
alongside a long chain of similar experiences. The barbarians are those who don’t
belong to the same conditioned chain. For “the aspirations and the instincts of the
individual are enmeshed in the past and to know the law of his being and realize it, it is
the law of the collective and national being that must be discerned and adored.”220
Within this philosophical conception the individual must constantly question
what it means to be part of a collective of similar individuals. It must know its past and
cherish it, as well as reject alien influences that may destroy the organic qualities of the
Self, developed throughout centuries. Tradition becomes “the certitude with which to
escape from nihilism, death, destruction, and decomposition.”221 The collective acts as a
purging edifice that must caution against alien voices such as cosmopolitanism,
internationalism, universalism, and in logical progression Judaism. Transposed into the
French setting the ideas of Barrès have dramatic consequences for those whose past is
not fundamentally intertwined with the past of the Self’s collective. The individual
identifies his place in France; it knows the nation’s history and traditions; it recognizes
its local churches, its rivers and fields, its food and language, its shape; and the Jew
doesn’t belong in this setting. He is a non-Self, an alien barbaric force that must be
repelled: “On the level of the collectivity, this method will form the foundations of antiDreyfusisme: the national organism will have to be purged of strangers such as Zola, of
the Jews….To follow its destiny, this organism must abandon itself to the forces of its
instinct and let the law of the race speak.”222 Barrès, the theoretician of nationalism,
became the organizer of the anti-Dreyfusards. Zola had created an image of the
movement but Barrès responded with his own ideology, thus influencing antiDreyfusard discourse throughout the Affair. Whereas for many anti-Dreyfusards the
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important question was if Dreyfus was guilty or not, for the leading voices of the
movement the Affair developed into a symptomatic case of modern France’s ills.
Barrès’

conception

of

the individual

is strikingly

different

to

the

Enlightenment’s. Whereas “Kant had begun to regard liberty as the first principle of
morality, and the theory of the social contract as the only political philosophy
compatible with such a conception of morality,”223 Barrès offers a pre-modern
understanding of the individual as a product of a cultural and historical context. The
Self may initially present itself as a free agent capable of action, but by arguing that it
can only exist in the world through association with other Selves, through a rejection of
equality, through a suspension of liberty, it in fact ceases to be an individual and
becomes part of a larger whole.224 Its existence, its meaning, its place in the world, all is
determined by its association with other similar Selves. The concept of the individual on
which modernity is founded is rejected and replaced by a modern philosophical system
that aims to restore a premodern understanding of man, one where the individual only
has meaning in the social and political collective.225
At the heart of this issue lie the central conflicts of the modern State in relation
to its citizens: “What is the true nature of social relations? How does a group of human
beings become a society? What do the bases of collective existence consist of? What is
the nature of the relations between the individual and the collectivity and, by
consequence, what are the foundations of political legitimacy? What is it that allows
men to develop the minimum of solidarity that renders life together possible? What is it
that gives meaning to life in society? The most urgent question, the most immediate is
assuredly the one that requires a response to the question: ‘What is a nation?’ Is it an
ensemble of individuals with equal rights, as the French Revolution intended it in its
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very first years, or a body formed by history, by culture, by religion, by ethnicity?”226 In
1898 the French were busy with the case of one individual cast far away from the
territory. Dreyfus, the “barbarian” Barrès and his followers had excluded from France,
wrote to his wife: “‘I want to wish that I’ll still have a minute of happiness on this earth,
but that which I don’t have the right to doubt, is that justice will be made; it is that
justice be rendered to you, to our children. I will thus say have courage and have
confidence.’ Justice, the Fatherland, Dreyfus [could not] separate or oppose them.”227
It is important to remember the individual suffering of Captain Dreyfus.
However, his case still resonates not for the particular injustice it exposed but for the
fundamental questions it raised. The questions laid out by Sternhell must have followed
Zola as he sat down to write J’accuse, and they must have made their way into the
thought of Barrès as he decided to lead the anti-Dreyfusards. The Affair was not just an
excuse for larger political and ideological problems to be resolved; it was the very
litmus test by which these issues were debated. Barrès and Jaurès may have vaguely
remained on common ground, but the Affair highlighted how dramatically distinct were
their visions of France, statehood, and humanity.
The thought of Barrès “represents the willingness to overcome the banality of
the bourgeois world, the materialism of industrial society, the platitude of liberal
democracy; it is the willingness to give a new meaning to life.”228 In Barrès one finds
the trajectory of Herder’s thought: “Man is a tree in search of roots, for which land is
necessary, as well as sun and water. The land is France, the sun is its grandeur, water its
civilization and language.”229 But not all trees can be rooted in the same land, or else no
water will be left and the sun will no longer be felt. For Barrès this is precisely what the
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French Revolution carried out; the dissolution of society and the loss of a real future.
This is the great tragedy of his time,230 and “Dreyfus is but the representative, the
symbol, of the forces of evil that destroy France.”231
Although Barrès published Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme in 1902, once
the debates of the Dreyfus Affair had largely subsided, the essay provides an important
model of his ideas on nationalism and anti-Semitism. In the section entitled “I judge
Dreyfus as a Symbol in relation to France,” Barrès writes: “If Dreyfus is a traitor, to
release him would be an action of minimal importance; but if he is more than a traitor, if
he is a symbol, the case is altered: now it becomes the Dreyfus affair! Stop there! The
triumph of the Dreyfusard camp, the camp which supports Dreyfus as symbol, would
put into power those men whose intention it is to remake France in the image of their
own prejudices. And as for me, I want to preserve France. The whole of nationalism is
contained in that opposition.”232 Barrès became an anti-Dreyfusard because he
understood himself as a nationalist. What mattered was not the guilt of Dreyfus but the
interests of France. Barrès articulated a conception of morality fundamentally opposed
to the Kantian universalism espoused by the Dreyfusards. The question was not legal
but ideological, not particular but national. It thus concerned the image of France, her
future and integrity.
Since the Jews had to be excluded from the French nation envisioned by Barrès,
Dreyfus could not be tried according to universal maxims of truth and justice. Barrès
also attacked the Dreyfusard intellectuals’ grand expectations of the French nation:
“Absolute justice is beyond them. It may exist, but only in heaven. What French courts
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can give is French justice, a relative justice.”233 The question was not whether Dreyfus
had been judged rightly in accordance with universal maxims, but rather if his
condemnation served the interests of the French nation. Since Jews were alien to
France, and Dreyfus was a Jew, it followed that he had been rightly judged. Like the
army officers who had followed instinct and prejudice over evidence during the arrest of
Dreyfus, Barrès and his supporters deduced Dreyfus’ guilt from his being Jewish. This
is what Barrès meant when he said he knew Dreyfus was a traitor simply because of his
race. The logic of Barrès’ argument is profoundly anti-rational since it rejects facts and
evidence. It claims that because Jews are guilty of belonging to France (their citizenship
is in itself a crime), and since Dreyfus is Jewish, he is therefore guilty. J.S. McClelland
writes that “stated baldly, Barrès’s argument may seem crude. It may be, but the
journalistic genius of Barrès brings to it a real force. The fundamental assumption is
psychological. What we are, what is most important in us is something we cannot fully
comprehend. It is subterranean, dark, mysterious and terrifying. Moral and political
precept derive from this source.”234 In view of the influence exercised by Barrès, this
irrationalism cannot be discarded from any analysis of the Dreyfus Affair.

Édouard Drumont (1844-1917) was equally engaged in the rejection of universal
morality. Immersed in anti-Semitism, Drumont believed it to be the prime lens through
which the modern world could be observed and understood. His anti-Semitism was
“coarse and plebeian, so that coupled with the civilized, literary and aristocratic antisemitism of Barrès, the anti-semites covered the whole market, by catering for all
possible tastes.”235 Drumont was a minor journalist until he published La France juive
(Jewish France) in 1886. The long two-volume book was an instant success – 100,000
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copies were sold in the first two months – and by some counts one of the bestselling
books in the history of French publishing before World War I.236 In the preface to the
115th edition Drumont wrote: “When a nation feels a certain commotion in front of a
literary work, it is that the writer has all of a sudden formulated the secret thought that
many did not even acknowledge for themselves.”237 Drumont conciliated in antiSemitism “counter-revolutionary thought, Catholic tradition, and a populist and
socialistic anti-capitalism.”238 La France juive is long (over 1000 pages) and repetitive,
filled with contradictions and catchy phrases. It is more an exercise in rhetoric than a
philosophically or historically informed essay. The contrast with Barrès is striking, but
the desire to exclude the Jew from French society is based on the same preoccupations
and realizations.
In the introduction Drumont states that “the only one who has benefited from the
Revolution is the Jew. All comes from the Jew; all returns to the Jew.”239 The Jew can
now leave the ghetto and amass a fortune, travel and live where he pleases.240 Like
Barrès, Drumont evokes the French past and the French dead; he claims a specific
tradition – the Crusades, the Battle of Bouvines, Saint Louis, Henry IV, Louis XIV241 –
and stresses the idea that “if our parents devoted themselves, fell on the battlefields, it is
so that there be a France like there is an England and a Germany, so that our children
pray like their fathers prayed, and have a faith that upholds them in life.”242 About a
fourth of the book is dedicated to the history of Jews from their first settlement in
France up to the Revolution, and the rest focuses on the century up to the 1880s. It
quickly becomes clear that the objective of Drumont is not to trace a pseudo-history of
236

Lindemann, The Jew Accused, 83.
Édouard Drumont, La France juive : essai d’histoire contemporaine (Tome Premier) (Paris : Marpon
et Flammarion, 1887).
238
Bredin, L’Affaire, 45.
239
Drumont, La France juive, ii.
240
Ibid., 18.
241
Ibid., 61.
242
Ibid., 138.
237

90

Jews and anti-Semitism, but to focus on the recent history of Jews, that concerned with
the period following the Revolution. “Where is the Jew during the Revolution?”243 asks
Drumont. On the wait, ready to lay his roots in a country that is not his, preparing for an
invasion and happy to take advantage of the era’s confusion.
The Jew of La France juive is a fixed being whose nature does not evolve or
change. He is always Jewish, always adapting to the circumstances, but always ready to
profit from the hardships of others. He combines a disdain for religious charity,
traditional bonds and the history of France. Bredin clearly defines Drumont’s vision:
“Errant, the Jew is, by nature, without nation. Merchant, he is far from the soil. By
destiny, or by malediction, he is ‘international’. He likes money, no war. He feeds on
intelligence, no instinct... This land is not his. These dead are not his.”244 Drumont may
have created a caricature, but the consistency of his program propelled him into the
front ranks of journalism during the 1890s. For in spite of his contradictions, Drumont’s
importance lies both in the enormous success he had – as a writer, journalist and
politician – and in his ability to connect anti-Semitism to general anxieties about
modernity: “Anti-semitism appears as a reaction in the face of the fear of modernity.”245
Winock argues that Drumont was the first who turned anti-Semitism into a global
explanatory system.246
Following the enormous success of La France juive, Drumont founded the daily
La Libre Parole (The Free Word) on April 20, 1892, with the subheading “La France
aux Français” (France for the French). La Libre Parole was not the first anti-Semitic
newspaper in France but it became extremely successful due to its sensationalism and
consistent attacks on specific Jews. The journal “played a leading part in launching the
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Panama scandal in 1892, an affair, like that of the Union Générale, which capitalized on
popular prejudice against ‘Jewish Finance’ and political corruption.”247 Bredin writes
that “without L’Aurore and Zola, Dreyfus would have perhaps stayed in prison. But,
without Drumont and La Libre Parole, would he have gone to it?”248 It was La Libre
Parole that launched an aggressive campaign against the presence of Jewish officers in
the Army before the Dreyfus Affair broke out; it was again La Libre Parole that carried
out a campaign calling for the resignation of General Mercier, probably cornering him
into ordering an acceleration of the Dreyfus investigation and trial; and La Libre Parole
was also behind the revelation that made the arrest of Dreyfus known to the public;
finally, it was La Libre Parole that dedicated its pages to the general defamation of
Jews and pointed attacks on Dreyfus.
In its 1898 New Year’s address to its readers, just two weeks before the acquittal
of Esterhazy and the publication of J’accuse, La Libre Parole read: “The Jewish regime
appears to all as it is, as it has always been, that is to say as the negation of all ideals, of
all fatherlands, as the very negation of the right of each to existence, as the exploitation
of the work of all for the profit of a few.”249 On January 12, the day of Esterhazy’s
acquittal, a cartoon showed Dreyfus on an island, dressed with a German helmet, and
surrounded by his brother Mathieu, Scheurer-Ketsner, Reinach, and Zola – all crying
and surrounded by caricatures of crying Jews. The next day Drumont published his own
J’accuse – against the Dreyfusards – addressed to Félix Faure, President of the French
Republic: “What safety do you want there to be for a State that lets its military chiefs be
denounced, every morning, like idiots, crooks, miserable men capable of condemning
an innocent man without any proof.”250 On the 20th Albert Monniot echoed the ideas of
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Drumont and Barrès: “Patriotism, nationalism, are the very basis of anti-Semitism: it
suffices to be a good Frenchman to wish to see France purged of those elements that
sicken its blood and atrophy its brain.”251 An article by Gallus on February 13 entitled
“The Intellectuals and Decadence” did not directly mention Jews but it articulated a
premodern vision that can be linked to anti-Semitism: “The present is made of the past;
nothing is erased, everything is superimposed; nothing dissipates, everything
accumulates. Those things submerged under the ashes will reappear more glaring. They
are there; they sleep under our steps until the fatal resurrection.”252
Drumont and his collaborators continued their attack on Jews, Dreyfusards and
Dreyfus day in, day out. Drumont also linked the Jew to the concept of the individual:
“The Jew, whose inexorable ‘I’ excludes all that is not him, lives outside of this
collectivity.”253 Interestingly, La Libre Parole’s understanding of economics reveals a
pre-capitalist notion of wealth: “How did these people, who had nothing a hundred
years ago, could have the millions, the hotels, the castles, the woods, the field, if they
had not stolen them from those who possessed them?”254 It followed that a Jewish
officer in the Army had in fact taken the place of a real French officer. With a
circulation of 100,000 during much of 1898 and 1899 La Libre Parole was by no means
the most successful daily – La Croix had a circulation of 170,000, Le Petit Journal over
a million, Le Petit Parisien over 700,000, and Le Journal about 450,000 – but it sold
more than the centrist Le Figaro with 40,000 and the Dreyfusard L’Aurore with
25,000.255 The importance of the newspaper lay in its ability to mobilize anti-Semitic
feelings in a unified attack that targeted Dreyfusards as Jews, and Jews as Dreyfusards.
To be French, to be patriotic, to be moral, one had to be against Dreyfus.
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Drumont left the editing board of La Libre Parole in 1898, soon after he won the
election for Deputy of Algiers. He remained a Member of Parliament until his defeat in
the reelection campaign of 1902. The newspaper never recovered the success it enjoyed
during the late 1890s, but its influence inspired a generation of anti-Semites. In the
1930s, Henry Coston, an anti-Semitic journalist and collaborator during the German
occupation, founded a daily with the same name and ideological tendencies. Not only
with Drumont can one find links between the Dreyfus Affair and Vichy. The son of
Commander du Paty du Clam – the infamous officer in charge of Dreyfus’ arrest – was
no less than Charles du Paty de Clam, head of Jewish matters under Vichy from
February 1944 onward.256 When Charles Maurras, who lived until 1952, was
condemned as a collaborator at the end of World War II he cried “It is Dreyfus’
revenge.”257 More importantly, Vichy’s initial anti-Semitic measures excluding Jews
from French society put into action what Drumont, Barrès and other anti-Semites had
advocated forty years earlier.
But the comparison must stop there. Vichy was not the Third Republic, the
1940s were not the 1890s, Laval was not Barrès, deportation and extermination were
not exclusion and expulsion. It would be easy, even dangerous, to strike a teleological
argument as self-explanatory for the horrors of the occupation. The Jew described by
Barrès and Maurras may well be the Jew described by Goebbels,258 but this is as far as
intellectual history, or history for that matter, can take us in explaining the Holocaust.
To delineate a clear progression from Devil’s Island to Auschwitz would be a logical
aberration, not because the Holocaust cannot be understood, but because it cannot be
reduced to the ‘natural’ result of historical developments. As Wilson concludes: “If the
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Vichy episode underlines the strength of latent antisemitism in French society, it also
affirms, as we have argued, that extraordinary circumstances were required to translate
antisemitism from the realms of ideology and fantasy to those of law and action, and
that the wholesale slaughter of Jews, while it may have been generally acquiesced in
through fear, was rarely advocated by French antisemites in concrete terms.”259
Intellectual history deals with texts and ideas, and tries to delineate their development
throughout history. But La France juive or Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme cannot
explain how anti-Semitism evolved from a heated debate to a burning persecution.
The interest lies elsewhere; in the significance of the developments of 1898. As
far as “the attack on the Revolution in the nineteenth century centred on the connection
between eighteenth-century political thought and the Revolution itself,”260 antiDreyfusards such as Barrès and Drumont embodied a general suspicion of modernity.
The antagonisms of the Revolution, the contradictions of French history, the dangers of
the time, all were linked to a conflict between two world visions. As far as we can go in
striking a dividing line between the Dreyfusard and the anti-Dreyfusard camps, the truth
is that in many cases the contradictions cannot be resolved: “A Bonapartist like Paul de
Cassagnac or an anti-Semite like Octave Mirbeau joined the Dreyfusards, in opposition
to most of their kind. An aesthete like Barrès, the youthful maître, broke with most of
his disciples in joining the antirevisionist group.”261 And yet, when one looks at the
debates that enveloped the Dreyfus Affair it quickly becomes clear that they went
beyond conceptions of statehood and justice, that they transgressed the political and the
ideological, that they were not only about an accused standing against a State.
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Epilogue
On June 3, 1899, the Supreme Court of Appeal annulled the verdict of the 1894
court martial and ordered a new trial to take place in Rennes. After more than four years
at Devil’s Island Dreyfus returned to a France torn between two camps, and immersed
in philosophical, political and ideological battles. Unlike the 1894 trial, the Rennes trial
was public and generated great amounts of publicity. After 25 public sessions during the
month of August the Court declared Dreyfus “guilty with extenuating circumstances”
on September 9. The news shattered the Dreyfusards. Zola, who had returned from exile
in England with great expectations, published the article Le cinquième acte (The Fifth
Act) in L’Aurore:
I am in terror. It is no longer anger or vengeful indignation, the need to cry
out against crime and to demand its punishment in the name of truth and
justice; it is terror, the sacred terror of the man who sees the impossible
being realized, streams running back to their sources, the earth tumbling
into the sun. And at what I cry out is the distress of our generous and noble
France, it is fear of the abyss into which it rolls. We had imagined that the
Rennes trial was the fifth act of the terrible tragedy we had lived through
the last two years…How have we been deceived; a new turn of the wheel
has taken place, the most frightful of all…The trial at Rennes was only the
fourth act. Great God what will be the fifth? Of what new sorrows and
suffering will it be composed? To what extreme expiation will it throw the
nation? Is it not so?262
But France was too tired for a fifth act, its political elites too fearful of more
“sorrows and suffering,” and Dreyfus morally and physically unfit to continue yet
another fight for justice. On September 19, as Scheurer-Kestner died of cancer,
President Loubet issued a pardon for Dreyfus. The 1900 Paris Universal Exhibition
signaled that the Affair had come to an end as a moment of national consciousness. In
1902 the left won the Legislative elections and Clemenceau was elected Senator. That
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same year Zola died at his home asphyxiated by fumes escaping from the chimney.
Meanwhile, Dreyfus returned to his family and continued to fight for the revision of his
sentence. In March 1906 a new government including several Dreyfusards –
Clemenceau among them – was formed, and on July 12, 1906, the Supreme Court of
Appeal finally reached a ruling over Dreyfus: it annulled the Rennes trial, and
pronounced his rehabilitation and innocence. Dreyfus was awarded the Legion of
Honor and his reintegration into the Army took place at a small ceremony in the École
militaire on July 21, almost 12 years after his arrest.
Alfred Dreyfus retired from the army the following year, but when war broke
out in 1914 he enlisted in the 7th artillery division. In 1918 he was promoted to
Lieutenant-Colonel in the reserves. He died on July 12, 1935, at the age of 75.
Interestingly, in view of the republican symbol Dreyfus had become for many, he was
buried in the Jewish section of the Montparnasse cemetery in Paris on July 14.
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Conclusion
Although concerned with the Dreyfus Affair as a source of historical inquiry,
this thesis is fundamentally the articulation of an intellectual vision. If this vision may
have appeared transparent to the reader, its foundations must presently be explored.
Like any essay in intellectual history this project is the result of clear choices: Zola over
Jaurès, Barrès over Maurras, Herder over de Maistre, Tocqueville over Nietzsche, and
so on. The direction of the research and the general conclusions that have been extracted
from the Affair would have been very different had another course of inquiry been
followed. But it is also the case that “the history of ideas is not the story of a succession
of great philosophers, where one system of ideas and theories begets another,”263 or
where thinkers can be randomly selected to articulate different positions or opinions.
The logic behind intellectual history is at all times historical. It follows texts
within contexts and thinkers alongside events. Like the general historian, the intellectual
historian looks at documents with a chronology in mind. He cannot take texts and ideas
out of their context, just as the general historian cannot use a document from a different
time and place to reach conclusions about a specific period. Like the general historian,
the intellectual historian must make assumptions. In the same way that the former sees a
connection between the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, and the abolition of
privileges on August 4 of that same year, the latter can trace how the thought of Hegel
influenced the young Marx. In both cases the connections are the result of deductions
that necessitate general knowledge about the period in question, and not obvious
conclusions to be drawn naturally. Intellectual history, like all history, is the articulation
of these connections in a coherent manner.
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This project underwent a change of direction in the middle stages of the
research. The initial objective was to investigate the debates of the Dreyfus Affair
through a survey of major newspapers. Time limitations meant I could only look at a
narrow number of dailies spanning a short period of time. This initial phase yielded
three important conclusions. First, I slowly began to formulate an opinion on the
divisions between Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. The language and imagery
deployed indicated that the stakes were important, and that the debate went beyond the
traditional right-left political divide. I also realized that newspapers sometimes
remained repetitive and simplistic sources that showed few signs of development in face
of the Affair’s events. This second conclusion was interlocked with a general sense that
on its own the press would remain limited as a tool of intellectual inquiry. In order to
grasp the significance of the Affair I had to look elsewhere and start asking specific
questions.
My grasp of the conflict between newspapers as different as L’Aurore and La
Libre Parole, coupled with a reading of secondary sources, led me in a different
direction. Zeev Sternhell’s Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français allowed me to
understand the complexities of Barrès’ thought, arming me with the tools to grapple
with his anti-Semitism. The different questions that emerged out of this second phase –
Was anti-Semitism central to the Affair? Was there a clear divide between Dreyfusards
and anti-Dreyfusards? What role did intellectuals play in the press? What role did
intellectuals have in the shaping of the debates over Dreyfus? – led me to the most
important question: Why did the Dreyfus Affair become so important?
In trying to address the relevance of my own research I looked at the relevance
of the Affair under the Third Republic. The Affair seemed to present France with
crucial options. Many of these pointed in the direction of the debate over the nature of
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the modern State; a question as relevant in 1898 as it is today. Dreyfusards and antiDreyfusards were at odds over the place of the individual within the larger political
community. In this reading, which I still hold to be of some relevance, the conflict is
between supporters of individual justice on the one hand, and defenders of a strong
State on the other. But this conception of the Affair leaves out too much: the virulent
anti-Semitism, the debates over nationalism, the conflict with the heritage of the French
Revolution, the different conceptions of the individual.
Up to that point, the main limit of my research was that as an intellectual history
thesis it had failed to address the history of those currents that surfaced with such
intensity during the Affair. In order to answer why Dreyfus mattered so much I had to
go back to the sources of the conflict. If Zola and Barrès evoked particular ideas and
distinct visions of history, I needed to crystallize these divisions against the background
of nineteenth century French intellectual thought. Whereas Zola, Clemenceau, Barrès,
and Drumont were all obvious choices due to the key role they played during the Affair,
Tocqueville, Herder, Sartre, and Arendt were not.
Tocqueville and Herder were the most obvious of the four readings. In the case
of Herder I was prompted to approach his ideas after reading Sternhell’s analysis of his
influence on French intellectual thought. As for Tocqueville, a study of the French
Revolution seemed incomplete without him. As twentieth-century thinkers, Sartre and
Arendt posed more initial complications. And yet, their analysis of anti-Semitism and
its place in the modern world quickly proved relevant in dealing with extreme antiDreyfusards. Slowly but surely the Affair began to make more sense. The diatribes in
the newspapers were no longer the exaggerated rhetorical exercises of a few figures; the
secondary sources were no longer extrapolating on a mere legal affair; anti-Semitism
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began to make more sense as a political force; and the conflict between Dreyfusards and
anti-Dreyfusards became larger, more relevant, more powerful.
In the introduction to a collection of essays by Isaiah Berlin, Roger Hausheer
writes of the history of ideas: “Its central preoccupation consists in a large-scale
extension of the ancient injunction ‘know thyself’ to the collective historical whole, the
civilization or culture, in which the individual self is embedded, and of which it is in no
small measure a product.”264 The Dreyfus Affair has been consistently used to
emphasize different questions and problems. Insofar as it can be analyzed within a
larger intellectual frame, it can provide us with insight into our own questions as a way
of knowing ourselves. By placing the Affair within a conflict over the place of man in
the modern world I have tried to demonstrate how the Dreyfus Affair can still be of
relevance to our understanding of the present. In one sense the story belongs to the
Third Republic, to its tensions and contradictions, to fin-de-siècle irrationality and
fragility. In another, however, it also speaks for the modern era. At its heart lie problems
which have not been resolved: What is the place of the individual in the modern State?
What does it mean to be an individual in a Nation ? Are Nation States viable? But
perhaps more importantly, what is the place of human beings in the modern world? As
Bredin argues, the Dreyfus Affair can be understood as the product of a revolt against
modernity.265 At the heart of this question opposites are crystallized, and our
understanding of both the Affair and the modern world is filtered through a prism of
contradicting visions.
And yet, these conflicts cannot ultimately be categorically opposed. If politically
and philosophically they can only be spelled out through oppositions, historically they
must refute such a position. Even Barrès the polarizer holds words of synthesis: “I well
264
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know that Dreyfusisme and anti-Dreyfusisme should be incorporated into a superior
type….coordinate, if possible, these contradictory elements in a common ideal.”266
Dreyfus, like France, was inhabited by these “contradictory elements.” This is perhaps
the final lesson of the Affair. Above its divisions it embodies the problem of modern
man: the difficulty of making individual choices and taking sides. In some ways our
disproportionate interest in the Affair is perhaps no more than a gesture longing for
more serious times.
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